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POWERFUL PARTICULARS: THE REAL REASON 
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES THREATEN 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
ANDERS KAYE*
ABSTRACT
 The concept “criminal responsibility” plays an important role in Anglo-American 
criminal law. It is central to our excuse doctrines and provides a foundation for our 
punishment practices. Nevertheless, legal theorists and philosophers have sometimes argued 
that it is not appropriate to treat human wrongdoers as responsible actors. An important 
line of such challenges has been grounded in the behavioral sciences. Inspired by startling 
findings in psychology, sociology, criminology, neuropsychology, and other behavioral 
sciences, some theorists and philosophers have argued that these sciences show (or at least 
imply) that human acts are determined acts, that we therefore do not have free will, and 
that it is therefore wrong to hold us responsible for what we do. 
 While this behavioral science challenge could have radical implications for the criminal 
law, several influential criminal theorists have offered forceful arguments to rebut it.  In 
doing so, they have drawn on the philosophical debates about free will, determinism, and 
moral responsibility. In particular, they have advocated the philosophical position known as 
compatibilism, according to which determinism does not destroy individual responsibility. 
If compatibilism is correct, they argue, then determinism is not antithetical to responsibility, 
and we therefore need not worry about the implications of determinism we find in the 
behavioral sciences.  
 In this Article, I suggest that this compatibilist argument is inadequate. In fact, it fails 
to engage the most potent features of the behavioral science challenge. The real power of the 
behavioral science challenge, I will argue, is not that it suggests that determinism is true; 
rather, it is that the behavioral sciences bring determinism to life.   
 This is an important difference. We almost always conceptualize determinism in a 
highly abstract way: “everything that happens is destined to happen,” we say. “Everything 
has a cause.” The behavioral sciences, however, encourage us to imagine determinism in a 
new way. They provide us with concrete, vivid, and particular details about the ways in 
which human acts are actually caused. Reflecting upon these details enables us to shift from 
an abstract conception of determinism to a particularistic conception of caused human 
action. This particularistic conception, I will show, engages our emotions in a much deeper 
way than its abstract counterpart and induces a more careful consideration of the 
ramifications of determinism for our lives and acts. This, in turn, shifts our moral 
intuitions about determinism and responsibility and makes us more likely to see the 
behavioral science threat as a real and potent one.   
 If this is right, the compatibilist argument fails to engage the most potent features of the 
behavioral science challenge to criminal responsibility. The compatibilist argument is 
tailored to defuse anxieties about determinism understood in the abstract; but the 
behavioral sciences give us a taste of determinism in particular detail, and this 
particularistic determinism poses a much more serious challenge to the conventional view of 
criminal responsibility. This does not mean that criminal responsibility cannot be salvaged; 
but it does show that defenders of criminal responsibility have not yet met the full force of 
the behavioral science challenge. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 The behavioral sciences1 are always discovering new things about 
human beings, and criminal law scholars often wonder whether these 
discoveries have ramifications for the criminal law. One persistent 
question is whether these discoveries undercut criminal responsibili-
ty. As we read Freud and Skinner, study criminal genes and crimino-
genic environments, ponder the strange neurologies of violent minds 
and preconscious intentions, and discover the perplexing puppetry of 
social and situationist psychology, it comes to seem as though much 
of what the human actor does is driven by forces beyond his control. 
If so, can we really hold the criminal responsible for his crime? The 
question taps into classic debates about determinism, free will, and 
moral responsibility. On one common view, it is wrong to hold a per-
son responsible if she did not act with free will. The behavioral 
sciences seem to suggest that human acts are not really free. Is it 
therefore wrong to hold criminal actors responsible? 
 This line of thought could have radical ramifications for criminal 
law, and especially for contemporary punishment practices. Respon-
sibility plays an important role in punishment. For many people, 
even the basic inclination or desire to punish a wrongdoer depends 
upon the judgment that she is responsible for the wrong. And many 
people feel that punishment is not just unless the punished person is 
responsible for her act. As a result, doubts about whether a wrong-
doer is responsible can shake both the motivation and the justifica-
                                                                                                                                       
 1. In this Article, I use the term “behavioral science” broadly, encompassing not only 
the traditional behavioral sciences (including, for example, psychology, psychiatry, and 
neuropsychology), but, in addition, various social sciences that have been influential in 
analysis of criminal conduct (including, for example, sociology and criminology).  
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tion for punishing her. In this sense, the questions the behavioral 
sciences raise about responsibility also threaten to call into question 
contemporary punishment practices.  
 While anxieties like these arise periodically in criminal theory, 
criminal theorists have developed a number of moves for fending off 
this challenge from the behavioral sciences. One influential move 
draws on compatibilism, a concept developed by philosophers of free 
will and moral responsibility, to attack the challenge at its roots. 
Proponents of this “compatibilist move” contend that human actors 
can be responsible for their acts even if those acts are determined. If 
this is right, intimations of determinism in the behavioral sciences 
pose no threat to responsibility, for determinism and responsibility 
are compatible. This compatibilist move has been influential in crim-
inal theory—so influential that some compatibilist theorists now jo-
vially characterize behavioral science challenges to criminal respon-
sibility as pathological delusions.2
 Though it would be comforting if the compatibilist move could 
save responsibility from the behavioral science challenge, the chal-
lenge is not so easily put down. On the contrary, the proponents of 
the compatibilist move have not yet fully appreciated the nature of 
the behavioral science challenge. In this Article, I hope to show how 
this is so. I will highlight features of the behavioral science challenge 
that criminal theorists have so far failed to engage and show how the 
compatibilist move fails to meet those features. In so doing, I aim to 
move criminal theory regarding responsibility and the behavioral 
sciences out of its current rut and catalyze fuller engagement with 
the behavioral science challenge to criminal responsibility.     
 The argument begins with a brief summary of the traditional ar-
guments for and against the behavioral science challenge to criminal 
responsibility. The first section of Part II sets out the standard ar-
gument in support of that challenge, which might be called the “de-
terminism argument.” As I will explain, this argument takes the be-
havioral sciences to suggest that human conduct is determined, 
maintains that human beings are not morally responsible for deter-
mined acts, and concludes that it is therefore wrong to hold criminal 
actors responsible for their criminal acts. The second section of Part 
II briefly describes the most powerful of the traditional moves for re-
                                                                                                                                       
 2. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibil-
ity: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 379 (2005) (“This brief diagnostic note 
identifies a cognitive pathology, ‘Brain Overclaim Syndrome [BOS],’ that often afflicts 
those inflamed by the fascinating new discoveries in the neurosciences.”). For a similarly 
cheerful dismissal of deterministic challenges to responsibility generally, see Peter Westen, 
Getting the Fly Out of the Bottle: The False Problem of Free Will and Determinism, 8 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 599, 601-02, 652 (2005) (suggesting that concern about responsibility in a de-
termined universe is nonsensical and that the best way to deal with such concern is to 
“stop thinking about it”). 
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futing this deterministic challenge, one that defuses the challenge by 
adopting the philosophical position known as compatibilism. The 
compatibilist thesis is a reputable and sophisticated one, and crimi-
nal theorists versed in the philosophy of responsibility have generally 
been content to rest on this “compatibilist move” to dispatch the de-
terminist challenge from the behavioral sciences.   
 Against the backdrop of this traditional point and counterpoint, 
Part III moves to the crux of the argument, showing that the compa-
tibilist move is not sufficient to defuse the determinist challenge from 
the behavioral sciences. In fact, the compatibilist move fails to en-
gage the most potent features of this challenge. The real power of the 
behavioral science challenge, I will argue, is not that it suggests that 
determinism is true; rather, it is that the behavioral sciences bring 
determinism to life. This is an important difference. We almost al-
ways conceptualize determinism in a highly abstract way: “Every-
thing that happens is destined to happen,” we say. “Everything has a 
cause.” The behavioral sciences, however, encourage us to imagine 
determinism in a new way. They provide us with concrete, vivid, and 
particular details about the ways in which human acts are actually 
caused. Reflecting upon these details enables us to shift from an ab-
stract conception of determinism to a particularistic conception of 
caused human action. This particularistic conception, I will show, en-
gages our emotions in a much deeper way than its abstract counter-
part and induces a more careful consideration of the ramifications of 
determinism for our lives and acts. This in turn significantly shifts 
our moral intuitions about the significance of determinism for moral 
responsibility and makes us far more likely to see the behavioral 
science threat as a real and potent one. Live determinism strikes us 
more deeply than theoretical determinism.   
 If this is right, the compatibilist move fails to engage the most po-
tent features of the behavioral science challenge to criminal respon-
sibility. The compatibilist move is tailored to defuse anxieties about 
determinism understood in the abstract; but the behavioral sciences 
give us a taste of determinism in particular detail, and this particu-
laristic determinism poses a much more serious challenge for moral 
intuitions about responsibility. Defenders of criminal responsibility—
and the punishment practices that depend upon it—still have more 
work to do.   
II.   THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE CHALLENGE TO CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
 Since the early twentieth century, the behavioral sciences have 
generated a steady stream of new insights and discoveries regarding 
the sources and causes of human conduct. Some of these insights and 
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discoveries have changed the way we live our lives. They have influ-
enced how we treat mental illness and depression, educate our child-
ren, market our products, and regulate our markets and workplaces. 
At the same time, they have supplied us with a new vocabulary for 
discussing human experiences and human needs, one we use in every 
arena from literature to politics. It is not surprising, then, that crim-
inal law scholars sometimes wonder if such insights and discoveries 
have ramifications for criminal law—for our crime prevention strate-
gies, law enforcement methods, and punishment practices, or for the 
substantive content of criminal law itself.   
 One especially pressing concern for criminal law scholars is that 
these insights and discoveries may threaten criminal responsibility. 
This Part offers a brief overview of the traditional arguments for and 
against this behavioral science challenge. It begins by describing the 
most common formulation of the challenge, one that is rooted in an-
cient anxieties about determinism. It then sets out the most success-
ful of the traditional counterarguments, which is grounded in the 
philosophical doctrine known as compatibilism. 
A.   The Traditional Argument for the Behavioral Science Challenge: 
The Determinism Argument 
 In the traditional behavioral science challenge to responsibility, 
the behavioral sciences are conceived in a broad sense rather than a 
precise or technical one. The term is used to encompass conventional 
disciplines in the sciences concerned with explaining human beha-
vior, including, but not limited to, psychology (in its various forms),3
sociology, criminology, and certain lines of research in biology, physi-
ology, and neurology. Criminal theorists have been interested in 
these various sciences for several decades and attracted to different 
lines of theory and research at different times. As Freudian psychoa-
nalytic theory entered the popular consciousness, it drew the atten-
tion of scholars across several different disciplines, including philoso-
phy and criminal theory.4 The same thing happened with Skinnerian 
behaviorist psychology,5 influential theories in the sociology of crime 
(especially those positing relationships between crime and social, po-
litical, and economic conditions),6 more recent discoveries in the neu-
                                                                                                                                       
 3. Here we might talk about, for example, several sorts of research into mental func-
tion, behavior, personality development, psychodynamic psychology, behavioral psychology, 
cognitive psychology, social cognition, situationist psychology, and neuropsychology,  
among others.   
 4. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL.
L. REV. 601 (2005) (exploring the influence of psychoanalytic theory on criminal theorists 
and lawmakers in the early to mid twentieth century).  
 5. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 162-64 (Rev. ed. 1969). 
 6. See e.g., Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law 
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9 (1985).   
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rologies of intention and violence,7 and several strands of recent em-
pirical psychology (including cognitive psychology, social cognition, 
and situationist psychology).8
 As criminal theorists have engaged these different lines of re-
search and theory, they have sometimes worried that the behavioral 
sciences may call into question criminal responsibility.9 Broadly 
speaking, they have been concerned that the behavioral sciences may 
show that we cannot be morally responsible for our acts. Since many 
criminal theorists hold that moral responsibility is a prerequisite for 
criminal responsibility10, this would mean (for them) that actors can-
not be criminally responsible either.   
 Of course, this reasoning depends on the idea that the behavioral 
sciences call moral responsibility into question. Academic philoso-
phers have suggested several different ways in which this might be 
true,11 but the discussion among criminal law theorists has focused 
primarily on one sort of argument—an argument grounded in deter-
minism. According to this argument, behavioral science findings 
seem to show that human acts are determined, that forces and cir-
cumstances beyond our control cause us to do what we do much more 
pervasively than we realize. The Freudian theorist maintains, for ex-
ample, that our acts “are but facades for the expression of uncons-
                                                                                                                                       
 7. See e.g., Andrew E. Lelling, Comment, Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience and 
the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1471, 1520-26 (1993) (discussing possible significance 
of Dr. Benjamin Libet’s research into cerebral processes for criminal law). 
 8. See e.g., JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER (2005); Anders Kaye, Does Situa-
tionist Psychology Have Radical Implications for Criminal Responsibility?, 59 ALA. L. REV.
611 (2008). 
 9. For recent examples of criminal law commentators flagging this concern (some 
approvingly, some disapprovingly), see, e.g., Steven K. Erickson, Blaming the Brain, 11 
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 27, 30 (2010); Henry Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuros-
cience: An Early Look at the Field, 42 AKRON L. REV. 687, 699 (2009); Stephen O’Hanlon, 
Towards a More Reasonable Approach to Free Will in Criminal Law, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 395, 404-11, 420, 425-26 (2009); Peggy Sasso, Criminal Responsibility in 
the Age of Mind Reading, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (2009) (“To what extent does 
our criminal justice system rest on an assumption that the healthy adult has free will, and 
do recent advances in the neurosciences undermine our conception of free will in  
relevant ways?”). 
 10. Stephen Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV.
363, 430 (2004)  (“If so, ascribing moral responsibility may be unjustified, and criminal re-
sponsibility might also be in doubt for those who believe, as virtually all do, that genuine 
moral desert is at least a necessary precondition for criminal blame and punishment.”). 
 11. Other sorts of challenges might put aside the issue of determinism and focus in-
stead on whether the behavioral sciences show that human actors lack specific features or 
capacities necessary for moral responsibility. For example, schematic psychology might be 
read to show that human beings are unexpectedly deficient in sensitivity to morally signifi-
cant facts. See Anders Kaye, Schematic Psychology and Criminal Responsibility, 84 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). Situationist psychology might suggest that human be-
ings’ character traits or desires are not sufficiently coherent to support responsibility. See
Kaye, Situationist Psychology, supra note 8, at 612-14.    
2010]                     POWERFUL PARTICULARS 545 
cious wishes, or, rather, unconscious compromises and defenses.”12
The sociologist and the criminologist purport to show that hard so-
cioeconomic conditions inculcate control-destroying rage and power-
ful antisocial desires that drive antisocial acts.13 The neurologist, 
having discovered a striking correlation between childhood head in-
jury and adult criminal behavior, posits that much of the most se-
rious crime results from injuries that disable our prefrontal cortex, 
leaving our reflective thought processes unable to intervene effective-
ly against the impulses of the uninhibited limbic system.14 Situation-
ist psychology shows how passing and prosaic situational phenomena 
induce us to do things we do not approve of for reasons we do not un-
derstand.15 Schematic psychology suggests that environmental and 
cultural phenomena bequeath us perceptual and interpretive scan-
ning protocols that can channel us into choices and acts without our 
realizing it.16 Each line of research feeds the suspicion that seemingly 
spontaneous human actions are actually driven by gears and levers 
that can be discovered, described, and manipulated. In the place 
where we would hope to find something like a gloriously uncon-
strained soul, we instead bang our knuckles on pistons and radiator 
caps. In this way, behavioral science research begins to look like an 
ever-expanding catalogue of causal explanations for what we do and 
raises the possibility that we do what we do because of forces and cir-
cumstances beyond our control. In short, it suggests that our acts  
are determined. 
                                                                                                                                       
 12. John Hospers, Free Will and Psychoanalysis, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 
463, 466 (Herbert Morris ed., 1961) [hereinafter Hospers, Psychoanalysis]. Hospers elabo-
rated on this central claim in a variety of ways. See John Hospers, What Means this Free-
dom?, in FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM 31 (Bernard Berofsky ed., 1966) (stating that com-
mands from the unconscious are “exactly like the action of a powerful external force; [they 
are] just as little within [our] conscious control”) [hereinafter Hospers, Freedom]; id. at 27 
(“Countless criminal acts are thought out in great detail; yet the participants are (without 
their own knowledge) acting out fantasies, fears, and defenses from early childhood, over 
whose coming and going they have no conscious control.”); Hospers, Psychoanalysis at 
471(“[T]he domination of the conscious by the unconscious extended, not merely to a few 
exceptional individuals, but to all human beings. . . . the unconscious is the master of every 
fate and the captain of every soul.”).  
 13. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 6 (summarizing a vast body of relevant research in a 
well-known article on the rotten social background defense).  
 14. See, e.g., DOROTHY O. LEWIS, GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY: A PSYCHIATRIST 
EXPLORES THE MINDS OF KILLERS (1998) (applying this thesis and several other related 
ones to case studies of very violent criminals). 
15. See, e.g., LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991) (providing a seminal summary of situationist 
psychology); DORIS, supra note 8 (discussing implications of situationist psychology for vir-
tue ethics and various conceptions of responsibility); Kaye, Situationist Psychology, supra
note 8, at 613, 639-77 (discussing situationism’s ramifications for criminal responsibility).     
 16. The term schematic psychology encompasses several strands in social cognition. 
For a fuller discussion, see Kaye, Schematic Psychology, supra note 11.  
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 It is true, of course, that nothing in the behavioral sciences is suf-
ficient to establish the truth of determinism outright.17 Behavioral 
science findings do not come close to mapping a complete universe of 
causal explanations for human acts, and nothing in the research—
standing on its own—makes it obvious that such a map is inevitable. 
But we might naturally take the growing body of behavioral science 
findings to make an important contribution to the case for determin-
ism in human action. Our lives are full of causal stories about the 
events that make up our days. Perhaps the behavioral sciences, hint-
ing at still more causal accounts, supply the straw that breaks the 
camel’s back, moving us from doubting determinism to accepting it.18
More pointedly, the behavioral sciences speak to an area where it is 
notoriously hard to show causation—the domain of human acts—
making inroads in an area of especially stubborn ambivalence about 
determinism. Even here, the behavioral sciences seem to tell us, the 
machinery of causation is everywhere to be found. Thus, while noth-
ing in the behavioral sciences “proves” the truth of determinism, be-
havioral science findings may nevertheless contribute to the case  
for determinism.       
 If this is right, it raises an age-old question: can we be morally re-
sponsible for our own acts if those acts are determined? The question 
comes naturally from the common and (for many people) powerful in-
tuition that responsibility requires “true,” “contra-causal,” “meta-
physical,” free will; that it is wrong to blame a person for an act 
caused by forces and circumstances beyond his control.19 Holding ac-
tors responsible for such acts seems to turn responsibility into a per-
verse lottery, one in which phenomena beyond the actor’s control de-
termine whether he will be blamed and punished.20 And it indulges in 
a kind of moral tunnel vision, artificially isolating the wrongdoer 
from the vast web of things and events that contribute to his act. 
Many people have the intuition that this would be morally disturb-
ing.21 Thus, to the extent that the behavioral sciences suggest that 
our acts are determined by forces and circumstances beyond our con-
trol—that we do not have “true” free will—the behavioral sciences 
raise the possibility that it is wrong to treat us as responsible for our 
criminal acts. 
 On this line of reasoning, the behavioral sciences threaten crimi-
nal responsibility. Although the behavioral sciences do not conclu-
                                                                                                                                       
 17. See Dana K. Nelkin, Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism,
29 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 181, 193 (2005). 
 18. See id. at 194. 
 19. See, e.g., Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 72 (Gary Wat-
son ed., 2d ed. 2003) (describing and rejecting this view). 
 20. For fuller discussion of these “tunnel vision” and “lottery” arguments, see Kaye, 
Schematic Psychology, supra note 11. 
 21. Part III, infra, fleshes out one variant of this intuition in more detail.   
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sively show that human acts are determined, they give us all sorts of 
reasons to worry that determinism is true. If determinism is true, it 
may be wrong to hold human actors morally responsible for their 
acts. And if it is wrong to hold human actors morally responsible for 
their acts, then (on a common view) it is wrong to hold them crimi-
nally responsible. Thus, raising the possibility of determinism in hu-
man action, the behavioral sciences threaten to cast moral doubt on 
attributions of criminal responsibility. This is the traditional argu-
ment for the threat from the behavioral sciences.    
B.   The Traditional Argument Against the Behavioral Science 
Challenge: The Compatibilist Move 
 At first glance, then, the behavioral science challenge to responsi-
bility may appear to present serious problems for important aspects 
of our criminal law. It calls into question a cornerstone concept—
criminal responsibility—and casts doubt on the blaming and punish-
ing practices that depend upon that concept. In fact, however, crimi-
nal law scholars have persistently fended off this challenge. Indeed, 
they have knocked it down so effectively that it has rarely gotten 
more than a toehold in criminal theory.   
 In doing so, these scholars have made various sorts of moves.22 For 
example, one crude but common move is to declare that the criminal 
law should or must assume that human actors have “true” free will, 
notwithstanding any evidence to the contrary. Along these lines, 
Herbert Packer famously declared that “the law treats man’s conduct 
as autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desir-
able to proceed as if it were.”23 Another approach engages the prob-
                                                                                                                                       
 22. A taxonomy of the possible “moves” here might include several kinds of arguments 
against the behavioral science determinist challenge, including the following: arguments 
against the claim that the behavioral sciences suggest determinism is true; arguments 
against the claim that determinism is inconsistent with moral responsibility (discussed be-
low); arguments against the claim that moral responsibility is a prerequisite for criminal 
responsibility; arguments against the claim that criminal responsibility is a prerequisite 
for punishment; and arguments that even if the behavioral science determinist challenge is 
valid, it should or must be ignored for prudential reasons (this is one way to read the Her-
bert Packer argument quoted in the text following this footnote).   
 23. Herbert L. Packer, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74-75 (1968). Sanford 
Kadish expressed a similar view: 
The ancient notion of free will may well in substantial measure be a myth. But 
even a convinced determinist should reject a governmental regime which is 
founded on anything less in its system of authoritative disposition of citizens. 
Whether the concept of man as responsible agent is fact or fancy is a very dif-
ferent question from whether we ought to insist that the government in its 
coercive dealings with individuals must act on that premise. 
Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 287 (1968); see also
Westen, supra note 2, at 627-28, n. 61 and accompanying text (2005) (discussing Packer 
and Kadish and attributing similar views to Oliver Wendell Holmes and several others).   
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lem more directly. Rather than treating deterministic evidence from 
the behavioral sciences as beyond the pale or out of bounds, this ap-
proach treats such evidence as credible but inconsequential. Adopting 
the compatibilist view of responsibility, it maintains that, even if 
true, the deterministic implications of the behavioral sciences have 
no capacity to threaten responsibility. This move has been influential 
among theorists who pay concentrated attention to the nature and 
problems of responsibility and appears to supply the most persuasive 
argument to date against the behavioral science challenge to  
criminal responsibility.24
 “Compatibilism” is an umbrella term that subsumes diverse ac-
counts of responsibility.25 What these accounts have in common— the 
thing that makes them all “compatibilist”—is the claim that the free-
dom required for responsibility is not “true,” “contra-causal,” “meta-
physical” free will. The responsible actor need not originate her acts, 
and she can act freely (in the sense required for responsibility) even if 
her acts are determined by forces and circumstances beyond her con-
trol. On this view, responsibility is “compatible” with determinism—a 
determined actor can also be a responsible actor.26    
 For many people, this claim is startling and counterintuitive: it is 
natural to ask, how can I possibly be “free” if my acts are deter-
mined? Isn’t this like saying a shingle blown from a roof is “free” to 
fall to the ground,27 or a wound watch is “free” to tick?28 The whole 
idea seems like a “wretched subterfuge.”29 In response, compatibilists 
                                                                                                                                       
 24. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 2, at 402 (invoking compatibilism to fend off threat 
from behavioral sciences).  
 25. For recent surveys of compatibilism, see generally Michael McKenna, Compatibil-
ism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2004), http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism; Robert Kane, Introduction: The Contours of Con-
temporary Free Will Debates, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 3-41 (Robert Kane 
ed., 2002); DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL 89-126 (2001). 
 26. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
543 (1997). Influential examples include JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA,
RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 62-91 (1998); R. J.
WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 147-153 (1994); SUSAN WOLF,
FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 24-26 (1990). 
 27. See, e.g., ILHAM DILMAN, FREE WILL: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
INTRODUCTION 46 (1999) (quoting SIMONE WEIL, ON SCIENCE, NECESSITY, AND THE LOVE OF 
GOD, 177 (1968) (“Those whom we call criminals are only tiles blown off a roof by the wind 
and falling at random.”)). 
 28. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 100-01 (Oskar Piest 
ed., Lewis White Beck trans., Liberal Arts Press 1956) (1788) (suggesting that the so called 
freedom we enjoy in the determinist universe is “no better than the freedom of a turnspit, 
which when once wound up also carries out its motions of itself”); Hospers, Psychoanalysis,
supra note 12, at 463, 465 (freedom in a determined world is just the “freedom of the ma-
chine to stamp labels on cans when it has been devised for just that purpose”). 
 29. KANT, supra note 28 at 99-100.(“It is a wretched subterfuge to seek an escape in 
the supposition that the kind of determining grounds of his causality according to natural 
law agrees with a comparative concept of freedom. . . . In the question of freedom which lies 
at the foundation of all moral laws and accountability to them, it is really not at all a ques-
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have explained that, while responsibility requires freedom, the free-
dom involved in responsibility is not freedom from causation—not 
“true,” “contra-causal,” “metaphysical” freedom—but freedom from 
coercion or from other constraints on chosen action.30
 At the heart of this view is the idea that a person is free if she can 
do as she chooses.31 Not everyone has this freedom: a man in chains 
is not free to walk away, for example. It may also be necessary for the 
free actor to have certain basic features, or certain cognitive and ex-
ecutive capacities, such as the capacity for rational thought,32 or res-
ponsiveness to reasons,33 or a proper mesh of first order and higher 
order desires.34 When the agent lacks these capacities and features, 
her choices don’t seem like choices at all. But there is nothing about 
causation or determinism that necessarily blocks this sort of freedom: 
a choice is still a choice even when it is caused or determined, and 
nothing about being caused is inconsistent with having capacities 
and features like practical reasoning or responsiveness to reasons. If 
I decide to have a piece of pie because I like pie and see no good rea-
son not to have the pie, and if I have the usual capacities for practical 
reasoning and so on, my having the pie is chosen and therefore free. 
This is true even if my desire for the pie was written into my genes or 
programmed in me by lifelong exposure to seductive ads for pie, and 
even if my failure to recognize, understand, or act upon some very 
good reasons not to have the pie is determined by the unchosen limits 
on my perceptual, cognitive, and executive capacities. In other words, 
choices are choices even when they are caused or determined. And 
according to the compatibilist, the freedom to act as you choose 
(whether or not your choice is caused or determined) is enough for re-
sponsibility. This, the compatibilists say, is why we would distin-
guish between a person who angrily throws a rock at us and a hill-
side that drops a rock on our head. Even if both events are deter-
mined, it makes sense to treat the intentional throw as a different 
sort of event than the mindless drop. Even when a choice is deter-
mined, it is loaded with meaning that a brute physical event cannot 
have. This extra meaning, the compatibilists say, is strong evidence 
that freedom to act as one chooses is all that responsibility requires. 
“True” free will is not necessary.         
                                                                                                                                       
tion of whether the causality determined by a natural law is necessary through determin-
ing grounds lying within or without the subject . . . .”).  
 30. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 10, at 437-44; MOORE, supra note 26, at 543. 
 31. As the discussion below shows, this initial formulation is an oversimplification.  
 32. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 26, at 500-02 (discussing how insanity, involuntary 
intoxication, and infancy excuse criminal responsibility).  
 33. See FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 26, at 62-91. 
 34. See Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in FREE
WILL 323 (Gary Watson ed., 2004); Gary Watson, Free Agency, in FREE WILL 337, 338 
(Gary Watson ed., 2004).  
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 If the compatibilists are right, the determinist threat suggested by 
the behavioral sciences seems to lose its force. Even if the behavioral 
sciences suggest that much or all of what we do is caused, causation 
need not operate in a way inconsistent with choice. On the contrary, 
it is entirely plausible that the forces and circumstances that the be-
havioral sciences highlight exercise their power over us by causing 
our choices. If so, behavioral science findings suggesting that human 
acts are caused need not pose any threat to responsibility. So long as 
that evidence leaves room for choice (even if that choice is deter-
mined), behavioral science’s insinuations of determinism are neither 
here nor there for responsibility. Rather than rejecting behavioral 
science evidence of causation in human conduct as beyond the pale, 
the compatibilist can treat it as inconsequential.   
III.   THE POWER OF THE PARTICULARS: HOW THE BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCE CHALLENGE TRANSCENDS THE COMPATIBILIST MOVE
 The compatibilist move has been influential among criminal 
theorists versed in responsibility theory, most of whom take compati-
bilism to be a complete answer to determinist challenges to responsi-
bility and thus a complete answer to the challenge from the beha-
vioral sciences. Indeed, the compatibilist move has been so successful 
that the idea that the behavioral sciences might threaten criminal 
responsibility is now sometimes jovially characterized as a sort of pa-
thology.35 Nevertheless, I will argue that the compatibilist move is 
not sufficient to dispatch the challenge from the behavioral sciences. 
Indeed, the compatibilist move fails to address the most potent fea-
ture of that challenge, which lies not in its suggestions of determin-
ism, but in the particularistic character of its evidence.   
 The problem for compatibilism is that the behavioral sciences 
supply a wealth of detail regarding the causes of human action, and 
that reflecting on this detail amplifies a common and powerful in-
compatibilist moral intuition. The intuition, which I will call the “ori-
ginationist intuition,” has been at the center of recent debate about 
determinism and responsibility. It holds that a person can only be re-
sponsible for acts she originates.36 Because this intuition suggests 
that a person cannot be responsible for a determined act, it poses a 
serious problem for compatibilism. The behavioral sciences make this 
problem even worse. Describing some of the causes of human acts in 
vivid, specific, concrete detail, the behavioral sciences bring deter-
minism to life. In so doing, they induce us to engage in an especially 
searching and personal reflection on determinism and its ramifica-
                                                                                                                                       
 35. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 2, at 397. 
 36. For examples of originationism in the recent debate, see sources cited in footnote 
42, infra.
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tions. This process, in turn, charges up the originationist intuition 
and thereby energizes the argument that it is wrong to hold a person 
responsible for a determined act.  
 The behavioral science challenge, then, operates in two ways: in 
addition to suggesting that determinism is true, the behavioral 
sciences amplify the intuition that a person cannot be responsible for 
a determined act. The compatibilist move parries the first thrust by 
providing a theoretical account of responsibility in which persons can 
be held responsible even if determinism is true. Such abstraction, 
however, is ill-suited to meet the second thrust’s intuition-amplifying 
particularism. In this sense, the compatibilist move—an abstract an-
swer to determinism conceived abstractly—offers no reply to the 
threat presented by the nitty-gritty determinism of the behavioral 
science challenge.  
A.   The Originationist Intuition 
 While compatibilism is currently the leading position in the free 
will debate, compatibilists have yet to satisfy a significant school of 
philosophers who maintain that responsibility requires “true,” “ge-
nuine,”37 “metaphysical,”38 “transcendental,”39 or “contra-causal”40 free 
will, and that determinism and responsibility are therefore mutually 
exclusive. In the course of the long history of the debate, these “in-
compatibilists” have offered many and diverse arguments in support 
of the “true” free will requirement. Today, several influential incom-
patibilist arguments place significant weight on the originationist in-
tuition, which has emerged as an especially stubborn obstacle  
for compatibilism.41   
                                                                                                                                       
 37.  See Strawson, supra note 19, at 74 (using this language but rejecting the view  
it describes). 
 38. See generally Watson, supra note 34, at 222. 
39. See R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 13 (1994) (as-
sociating this expression with Kant). 
 40. See Strawson, supra note 19, at 79; see also MOORE, supra note 26, at 597.  
 41. While the incompatibilist position has sometimes been tied to the intuition that an 
actor chooses freely if he could have done otherwise, recent scholarship often grounds in-
compatibilism in the intuition that origination is a prerequisite for responsibility. See, e.g.,
PEREBOOM, supra note 25, at 4; Michael Corrado, Automatism and the Theory of Action, 39 
EMORY L.J. 1191, 1192, 1212 (1990); Galen Strawson, On “Freedom and Resentment,” in
FREE WILL AND THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES 85, 96 (Michael McKenna & Paul Russell eds., 
2008);). See generally Anders Kaye, The Secret Politics of the Compatibilist Criminal Law,
55 U. KAN. L. REV. 365 (2007 [hereinafter Kaye, Secret Politics] (explaining the origination-
ist intuition, with extensive citation to originationist scholarship). The term “origination” 
has not always been widely used, but origination language is becoming more common. See, 
e.g., Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentencing: 
Darrow’s Defense of Leopold and Loeb, 79 IOWA L. REV. 989, 1019–21 (1994); Robert Kane, 
Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF FREE WILL 3, 5 (Robert Kane ed., 2002); Michael McKenna, Source Incompatibilism, Ul-
timacy, and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility, 38 AM. PHIL. Q. 37, 40 (2001); Derk Pere-
boom, Determinism al Dente, in FREE WILL 243, 245 n.7 (Derk Pereboom ed., 1997); Gary 
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1.   The Essence of the Originationist Intuition 
 The essence of the originationist intuition is that a person must 
originate an act in order to be morally responsible for that act.42 That 
is, she must be the “ultimate”43 or “regressive”44 cause of her act, 
meaning that the act was not determined by forces and circums-
tances outside her control. Her act must be “governable by her self ad
                                                                                                                                       
Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
256, 282 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); Roy C. Weatherford, Compatibilism and Incom-
patibilism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 144, 144 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995). 
Other terms have been used to identify the origination requirement. See, e.g., PEREBOOM,
supra 25, at 54 (referring to the concept as the “Causal History Principle”); Susan L. Hur-
ley, Debate: Luck, Responsibility, and the ‘Natural Lottery,’ 10 J. POL. PHIL. 79, 82 (2002) 
(“Lack of control of causes is . . . incompatible with responsibility,” and “responsibility re-
quires regressive control.”); Anders Kaye, Resurrecting the Causal Theory of the Excuses,
83 NEB. L. REV. 1116, 1117 (2005) (calling “the moral principle that actors cannot be 
blamed for conduct caused by forces beyond their control” the “control principle”) [hereinaf-
ter Kaye, Causal Theory]; Dana K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY § 1, 2004, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/moral-luck (stat-
ing that the “Control Principle” holds that “we are morally assessable only to the extent 
that what we are assessed for depends on factors under our control”). 
 42. See, e.g., PEREBOOM, supra note 25, at 4 (“[A] claim about origination . . . might be 
formulated as follows . . . an agent is not morally responsible for [a] decision if it is pro-
duced by a source over which she has no control.”); Michael Corrado, Addiction and Causa-
tion, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 913, 915 (2000) (“If there is an unbroken causal history for a 
certain action, extending back to some event over which the agent had no control, then the 
agent is not (morally) responsible for that action.”) [hereinafter Corrado, Addiction]; Cor-
rado, Automatism, supra note 41, at 1201, 1225 (“I am responsible only for those things 
that are up to me; to be responsible, I must have some say in the matter. But I have no say 
in the matter of caused action.” For an actor to be responsible for an act, “[t]he volition . . . 
that leads to the behavior must be the first event in a causal chain . . . and must itself be 
uncaused.”); Delgado, supra note 6, at 55 (“[B]lame is inappropriate when a defendant’s 
criminal behavior is caused by extrinsic factors beyond his or her control.”); Kane, Intro-
duction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FREE WILL, supra note 41, at 3, 5 (“[W]e believe we have free will when . . . the origin or 
source of our choices and actions is in us and not in anyone or anything else over which we 
have no control.”); Weatherford, supra note 41, at 144 (“The incompatibilist defends his 
view by arguing that a free act must involve . . . the freedom to choose called origination.”); 
see also DANIEL DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING
76 (1984) (noting that “[w]e want to be able to say of ourselves, as Harry Truman famously 
said, ‘the buck stops here,’ “ but rejecting the origination requirement).   
43. PEREBOOM, supra note 25, at xv (“[M]oral responsibility requires actions to 
have . . . causal histories that make agents ultimate sources of their actions.”); McKenna, 
supra note 41, at 40-41 (2001) (describing the “ultimacy condition,” which holds that a per-
son is not responsible for her acts if she is not the ultimate source of her acts); WOLF, supra 
note 26, at 10 (describing, but not endorsing, the view that “there is a requirement that the 
agent’s control be ultimate—her will must be determined by her self, and her self must not, 
in turn, be determined by anything external to itself”); Paul Russell, Pessimists, Pollyan-
nas, and the New Compatibilism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 228, 248 (Ro-
bert Kane ed., 2002) (discussing the “capacity for ultimate control”). 
44. See S.L. HURLEY, JUSTICE, LUCK, AND KNOWLEDGE 17, 111 (2003) (describing the 
regression requirement and stating that “to be responsible for something you must be re-
sponsible for its causes,” thus, “[r]egressive control of X requires control of X’s causes as 
well as of X itself”). Hurley rejects the notion that regressive control is required for moral 
responsibility. Id. at 80-105. 
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infinitum”;45 she must “will” her act “without being caused to will
it.”46 Of course, other forces and circumstances will influence her or 
play a role in bringing about her act (indeed, she would not have ex-
isted, let alone acted, but for such forces and circumstances). But if 
the act was determined by forces and circumstances beyond her con-
trol, then the original cause of the act lies in those forces and cir-
cumstances, not in the actor, and she is not responsible for it. As phi-
losopher Derk Pereboom puts it, “if an action results from a determi-
nistic causal process that traces back to factors beyond the control of 
the agent, he is not morally responsible for the action.”47    
 Like other moral intuitions invoked in the debates about free will 
and responsibility, the originationist intuition can seem at once natu-
ral and obscure. At least some facets of this intuition, however, are 
accessible. For example, the originationist intuition has a strong con-
nection to concerns about fairness: it feels natural to say that the 
reason a person should not be blamed for an act she did not originate 
is that this would be unfair. The unfairness, in turn, seems to have 
several different facets. For example, it may be unfair to blame a 
nonoriginator in the way that charging the wrong person is unfair. 
Something else is the origin of the act, not her; that “something else” 
should bear the brunt of our negative reactions to her wrongdoing. 
Relatedly, it may be unfair for the reason that doing so involves an 
element of arbitrariness. The causal chain leading to her act was long 
and diverse, but all the attention and feelings associated with blame 
have been focused on a single link in the chain—the actor herself. 
She might contend that excising her action from the causal chain this 
way is morally random, an artifact of the amoral fact that human be-
ings tend to notice human beings more readily than they notice other 
things. Along another line, blaming her may be unfair in that it 
treats her differently than others (those who are not being blamed) 
without sufficient justification. True, she has done a bad act that 
they have not done; but if she did not originate the act—if the act was 
the result of forces and circumstances beyond her control—then it is 
not clear that her bad act distinguishes her from the rest of us in a 
way that can justify imposing a distinctive and undesirable moral as-
                                                                                                                                       
 45. WOLF, supra note 26, at 35. 
 46. Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 78 
n.83 (2005); see also Corrado, Automatism, supra note 41, at 1192 (“Actions are not volun-
tary unless they are up to the actor, and actions that are caused by prior conditions are not 
up to the actor.”). 
 47. Pereboom, Determinism al Dente, supra note 41, at 246. More colloquially, “if 
agents’ acts are caused by factors for which they are not responsible, then how can they be 
morally responsible for acting as the result of those factors?” MARTHA KLEIN,
DETERMINISM, BLAMEWORTHINESS, AND DEPRIVATION 50 (1990); see also Corrado, Addic-
tion, supra note 42, at 915 (using similar formulation); Corrado, Automatism, supra note 
41, at 1201, n.80 and accompanying text (same). 
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sessment on her alone. In some ways, these are concerns about moral 
luck: when the actor does not originate her act, forces and circums-
tances beyond her control determine that she will be blamed in the 
same way that lottery ping-pong balls decide who will be a millio-
naire, and that seems worrisome. They also reflect concerns that con-
ceptually severing the actor from the environment that shaped her 
act—making her bear the burden of our reactions alone—involves a 
kind of moral tunnel vision, an impoverishing exclusion of morally re-
levant facts. Such moral luck and tunnel vision concerns suggest, 
among other things, a deep underlying concern about fairness.     
 The originationist intuition has other sorts of roots too. For exam-
ple, it seems to be connected to attitudes like empathy, compassion, 
and identification. When theorists set out to explain why causal ex-
planations of human acts tend to defuse blaming reactions, they often 
cite the French proverb “tout comprendre, c’est tout pardoner” (“to 
understand all is to forgive all”).48 Similarly, they suggest that causal 
explanations help us stand “in the other’s shoes,” and they invoke 
ideas like “it could have been me” and “there but for the grace of God 
go I.”49 One way to understand why these proverbs and ideas are fit-
ting here is that learning about the forces and circumstances that 
cause a person to act seems to catalyze a change in our own thoughts 
and feelings. It seems to connect us to the actor in an intimate way. 
We empathize with the actor: with the causal details of his life laid in 
front of us, we slip imaginatively “into his shoes” and experience 
thoughts and feelings that echo or mimic his. At the same time, we 
identify with the actor, for cataloging the distinctive causal influ-
ences involved in his distinctive conduct makes it easier to see how, 
but for those influences, he could have been a “normal,” familiar per-
son with a “normal,” familiar life. Now we see how we “could have 
been” him, but for “the grace of God.” These empathetic and identify-
ing reactions throw cold water onto our hot reactions to wrongdoing. 
Perhaps this is because empathy and identification are so conducive 
to compassion, and there is a tension between the tenderness of com-
passion and the pain we normally associate with being blamed. Per-
                                                                                                                                       
 48. MOORE, supra note 26, at 488, n.11 (“The proverb is usually taken to assume that 
one understands another’s behaviour when one knows the causes of that behavior.”). 
 These sentiments have sometimes been associated with incompatibilism generally, 
rather than originationism in particular. The primary reason for this association, I think, 
is that originationism’s central role in incompatibilism has only recently crystallized in re-
sponsibility theory. But even in the time before originationism came to the fore, theorists 
discussing these sentiments discussed them in ways that clearly tied them to the origina-
tionist intuition. See, for example, Michael Moore’s discussion of the Yale killer, in 
PLACING BLAME, in which Moore attempts to defuse our intuitive reactions to information 
about certain formative influences in the killer’s life. Id. at 578-83. His invocation of these 
sentiments speaks not to the alternate possibilities flavor of incompatibilism, but to the 
originationist one.  
 49. See Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 41. 
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haps it is because we scrutinize rationales for blame more closely 
when we are in the shoes of the blamed; imagining how blame will 
feel to them and imagining it happening to us may inspire us to take 
a more critical look at those rationales. Or perhaps it is because we 
imagine more vividly and personally what it means to be determined 
and in so doing discover a latent tension between being determined 
and being blamed. The result is that knowing how causal explana-
tions of human acts undercut the impulse to blame, we become reluc-
tant to blame actors for acts they did not originate.     
 The intuition also seems to be grounded in a stubborn and ubi-
quitous feature of popular or folk psychology.50 As philosopher Galen 
Strawson writes, our “sense of self is of a profoundly libertarian cast 
[such that we] naturally and unreflectively conceive[] [ourselves] . . . 
as standing in some special . . . relation of true-responsibility-
creating origination to [our] choices and actions.”51 This folk psychol-
ogy notion that we can escape the causal calculus and that this is 
something special and distinctive about us feeds directly into folk 
theories of responsibility: on these theories, this special fact about 
us—that we can and do originate our acts—is an important piece of 
the story about why it is appropriate to hold us responsible. In this 
light, our capacity for origination makes it seem natural that “deter-
minism is incompatible with freedom,”52 augmenting “the power of 
the basic incompatibilist intuition.”53
 Grounded, then, in concerns about fairness, in attitudes like em-
pathy and identification, and in a core component of folk psychology, 
the originationist intuition is (for many people) an appealing and 
natural-seeming one. Not surprisingly, it also appears to be quite 
common. In formal philosophy, it is associated with two traditional 
and often defended lines of thought—”hard determinism” (the view 
that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism and that 
determinism is true),54 and libertarianism (the view that moral re-
sponsibility is inconsistent with determinism, and that determinism 
is false)55—and with the concern that attributions of responsibility 
should not turn on “moral luck.”56 Philosophers typically describe the 
                                                                                                                                       
 50. As I have suggested in the text, I think the moral intuitions involved in the re-
sponsibility debate are complex and, in some ways, obscure. In keeping with this view, I 
expect that I have only scratched the surface of the ideas, concerns, values, and attitudes 
that fund the originationist intuition. For some related discussion, see Part III.B., infra.   
 51. Strawson, supra note 40, at 95.     
 52. Id. at 88.  
 53. Id. (stating that it is “a natural fact about … beings like ourselves” that “the in-
compatibilist intuition has such power for us”). 
 54. See Weatherford, supra note 41, at 144.   
 55. See Derk Pereboom, Introduction to FREE WILL vii (Derk Pereboom ed., 1997). 
 56. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in FREE WILL 174, 174-86 (Gary Watson ed., 
1992) (1982); see generally Nelkin, supra note 41, § 1 (describing “moral luck” as occurring 
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intuition as “a widespread attitude”57 that “many people agree”58 with 
and “find hard to reject.”59 Indeed, even staunch compatibilists rou-
tinely concede that this is a common and powerful intuition for most 
people in their daily lives. “Many people,” compatibilist criminal 
theorist Stephen Morse writes, “also seem to believe that ‘real’ re-
sponsibility is impossible unless people have freedom in the strongest 
sense. Unless, that is, people . . .  are ‘prime movers unmoved,’ and 
the like. . . .”60 This intuition, he says, “exerts a powerful hold on us, a 
hold that I am prey to and worries me.”61 Fellow compatibilist Mi-
chael Moore suggests something similar when he describes the 
“common sense” impulse to excuse that arises when “we come to 
know the causes of behavior.”62
 The originationist intuition, then, is appealing, common, and nat-
ural-seeming, and an important part of both folk and formal theories 
of responsibility. It is also incompatible with compatibilism. Accord-
ing to the originationist intuition, a person cannot be responsible for 
                                                                                                                                       
“when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment despite the fact that a 
significant aspect of what she is assessed for depends on factors beyond her control”).  
 57. Pereboom, Determinism al Dente, supra note 41, at 245 n.7 (noting the view that 
“compatibilists ignore a widespread attitude about our actions, that moral responsibility 
presupposes origination, or agent causation.”); see also Manuel Vargas, Philosophy and the 
Folk: On Some Implications of Experimental Work for Philosophical Debates on Free Will, 6 
J. OF COGNITION & CULTURE 239 (2006) [hereinafter Vargas, Folk] (explaining that recent 
empirical studies support the view that at least one important segment of folk moral intui-
tions is incompatibilist, though not explicitly identifying the relevant incompatibilist intui-
tions as originationist); Manuel Vargas, Responsibility and the Aims of Theory: Strawson 
and Revisionism, in FREE WILL AND REACTIVE ATTITUDES 297, 297-318 (Michael McKenna 
& Paul Russell, eds., 2008) (stating that compatibilist accounts of responsibility must be 
seen as revising [modifying and transforming] the account our folk intuitions give us, ra-
ther than exemplifying it). 
 58. PEREBOOM, supra note 25, at xiii (observing that “many people agree that crimi-
nals cannot be blameworthy for actions” caused by external influences). 
 59. Corrado, Addiction, supra note 42, at 916.  
 60. Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual 
Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 345 (1998). 
 61. Id. at 347. Philosophers have long used the concept of the “prime-mover un-
moved”—an actor who moves himself, rather than being moved by forces and circums-
tances beyond his control—to describe the originationist intuition. Id. at 345. 
 62. Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1985) 
[hereinafter Moore, Causation]. Other compatibilists concede the ubiquity and power of in-
compatiblist intuitions, but do not signal as clearly that they are referring to originationist 
intuitions in particular. See, e.g., WALLACE, supra note 26, at 58 (discussing “the persis-
tence of incompatibilist elements in our thinking about moral responsibility,” and noting 
that “[s]tudents . . . are quite easily led to the conclusion that it would not be justifiable to 
hold people morally responsible for what they do if determinism were true . . .”); see also id.
at 222 (discussing the “widespread tendency to think about responsibility in incompatibil-
ist terms” and observing that “students are frequently drawn to incompatibilism as a kind 
of default position and tend to view compatibilist arguments with suspicion, as attempts to 
talk them out of something that is virtually obvious outside of the classroom.”). But see
HURLEY, supra note 44, at 96 (suggesting that the “regression condition”—related to the 
control principle—”is highly controversial between people” because “[i]ndividuals may . . . 
have internally conflicting intuitions about whether responsibility must be regressive”). 
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an act he does not originate. According to conventional understand-
ings of determinism and origination, a person cannot originate an act 
that is determined, for such an act originates with the forces and cir-
cumstances that determined it, and not with the actor.63 Therefore, if 
the originationist intuition is correct, an actor cannot be responsible 
for a determined act. In short, the originationist intuition flatly con-
tradicts the compatibilist claim that a person can be responsible for a 
determined act.   
 The originationist intuition, then, poses a serious problem for 
compatibilism and the compatibilist move. It is a common and power-
ful moral intuition. It is rooted in important concerns about fairness, 
in morally significant attitudes like empathy, identification, and 
compassion, and in an important vein of folk psychology. And it di-
rectly contradicts compatibilism, casting doubt on the compatibilist 
defense of responsibility for determined acts.   
2.   Compatibilist Objections to the Originationist Intuition: The 
Mirage Arguments 
 Compatibilists have long recognized that incompatibilist intui-
tions like the originationist intuition pose a serious threat to compa-
tibilism, and in response they have offered various sorts of argu-
ments to the effect that these intuitions should not be credited.64 An 
especially common move is to argue that such intuitions are illusory 
mirages that dissipate upon closer inspection.65 To date, however, 
these “mirage arguments” have seemed ad hoc, underdeveloped, and 
considerably less robust than the core compatibilist thesis.      
 For example, compatibilist criminal theorists sometimes argue 
that, even if moral intuitions are central to analysis of responsibility, 
incompatibilist intuitions (such as the originationist intuition) should 
be set aside as specially pathological or perverse. Along these lines, 
Michael Moore has characterized incompatibilist intuitions as ana-
logous to optical illusions, like perceptions of sticks half-submerged in 
                                                                                                                                       
 63. McKenna, supra note 41, § 2.2 (2001) (“If determinism is true, [an agent’s] actions 
do not originate in her . . . .”). 
 64. Although the originationist intuition has played a role in incompatibilist argu-
ments for many years, the shift to explicitly originationist arguments in incompatibilism is 
still relatively recent. As a result, compatibilists have not always explicitly addressed ori-
ginationism. Nevertheless, because the originationist intuition has long lurked at least im-
plicitly in incompatibilist argument, compatibilist replies to incompatibilism have often of-
fered (at least implicit) answers to originationist concerns.       
 65. There are other ways to approach the problem posed by the originationist intui-
tion. For example, a compatibilist might argue that even if this is a common and powerful 
moral intuition, moral intuitions are not dispositive to, or not powerful in, or not germane 
to, reasoning about responsibility. To the extent that such claims are true, they mitigate or 
dissolve entirely the problem posed by the originationist intuition. To my eyes, these sorts 
of claims are uncommon in criminal theory regarding responsibility. As a result, my dis-
cussion focuses on the sort of argument identified in the text.       
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water, which appear bent even though they are not.66 But arguments 
like these appear ad hoc: moral intuitions are reliable, except that 
here they are not. Without a principled statement of the basis on 
which some intuitions are to be rejected, the rejection appears arbi-
trary. Moreover, it is hard to avoid the impression that the intuition 
singled out for doubt is selected precisely because it is inconvenient 
to the compatibilist argument, and thus that the argument has been 
reverse engineered from the desired result.     
 A more compelling response to incompatibilist intuitions argues 
not that these intuitions can be dismissed as entirely ephemeral illu-
sions, but that these intuitions are like mirages that tend to dissolve 
when carefully scrutinized. That is, these are superficial intuitions 
that give way to more powerful ones as we move toward reflective 
equilibrium (or traverse some other analogous process for refining 
moral intuitions). Along these lines, Moore argues that careful reflec-
tion reveals that incompatibilist intuitions go hand in hand with pa-
ternalism and elitism, and that discovering this partnership strips 
incompatibilism of its intuitive appeal.67 This approach is certainly 
an improvement over the ad hoc one described above. Even so, it re-
mains too glib in its characterization of incompatibilist intuitions, for 
much more work would have to be done to establish that origination-
ism is more conducive to elitism and paternalism than compatibilism, 
let alone that incompatibilist intuitions and paternalism are neces-
sarily linked. And even if such a link could be established, it would 
only open up the question of what other linkages can be drawn be-
tween these two views and other morally and politically unpalatable 
attitudes and consequences. Indeed, as I have argued in detail else-
where, there is good reason to think that compatibilism is much more 
closely bound to problematic attitudes and consequences of the sort 
that might undermine its intuitive appeal.68 For example, compatib-
ilism is startlingly protective of the socioeconomic and political  
status quo and strikingly insensitive to the conditions and expe-
riences of the socioeconomically disadvantaged, suggesting an alle-
giance to privileged social and political interests.69 The problem with 
Moore’s move here, then, is not that it is illegitimate, but that, on the 
one hand, it is underdeveloped, and on the other hand, it opens the 
door to an array of considerations that reflect more favorably on in-
                                                                                                                                       
 66. MOORE, supra note 26, at 544. 
 67. According to Moore, originationist intuitions are conducive to “elitism and a con-
descension” and to denying “the equal moral dignity of others.” Id., at 545-46; see also id. at 
148-49 (“Such discrimination is a temptation to be resisted, because it is no virtue. It is 
elitist and condescending toward others not to grant them the same responsibility and 
desert you grant to yourself.”). For another account suggesting that there is something cor-
rupt about these sympathetic attitudes, see DENNETT, supra note 42, at 167. 
 68. Kaye, Secret Politics, supra note 41, at 380-425. 
69. Id. at 405-25. 
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compatibilist intuitions than compatibilism. If so, it fails to fend off 
the originationist intuition.          
 Taking another tack, compatibilists have argued that our actual 
punishment practices buttress the conclusion that our “real” intui-
tions are compatibilist.70 The argument starts with an observation 
about our actual practices: we excuse some actors who do bad things, 
but we do not excuse them all. It then adds a claim about determin-
ism—that determinism (or some functional equivalent) is obviously 
true. Finally, it contends that, given these premises, our punishment 
practices must reflect compatibilist intuitions. After all, if determin-
ism is true, the incompatibilist must excuse every actor (since the in-
compatibilist holds that responsibility and determinism are incom-
patible). Since we do not excuse every actor, we must not be incompa-
tibilists. In this sense, our punishment practices strongly suggest 
that our “real” intuitions are compatibilist.71 Even if we are attracted 
to origination and other incompatibilist concerns in the abstract, we 
are really compatibilists when the chips are down.        
 Unfortunately, this analysis makes an important error in its eval-
uation of our punishment practices. Its error is that it presumes that 
those who participate in these practices believe determinism (or some 
functional equivalent) is true. To support this presumption, compati-
bilist criminal theorists insist that morally significant indeterminism 
is so absurd that most people will, by common sense, reject it.72 The 
problem with this argument is that it confuses what people “should” 
believe with what people actually believe. In fact, it appears that 
most people do not believe determinism is true,73 and that most 
people are (in their daily lives) libertarian indeterminists who believe 
that people can and do act with “genuine” or “metaphysical” free will 
most of the time.74 Indeed, contemporary American political culture 
provides strong motivations to reject determinism.75 For example, in 
our cultural context, many people experience determinism as deeply 
threatening to cherished ideas about individual identity and about 
the stature and significance of the human individual.76 Likewise, 
                                                                                                                                       
 70. See Moore, Causation, supra note 62, at 1112. 
 71. Id. at 1112. 
 72. See Kaye, Causal Theory, supra note 41, at 1133-35 (2005) (summarizing the par-
tial-determinism critique); see also Moore, Causation, supra note 62, at 1114-28 (criticizing 
partial-determinist strategies). 
 73. See, e.g., Vargas, Folk, supra note 57, at 241 (reviewing empirical research finding 
that “95% of the respondents describe[d] [a] . . . universe . . . where human decisionmaking 
is not completely determined by prior events . . . as the one most like ours.”); see also Kaye, 
Causal Theory, supra note 41,  at 1135-37. 
 74. See, e.g., Strawson, supra note 19.  
 75. Kaye, Causal Theory, supra note 41, at 1135-57 (setting out reasons to believe that 
many people are partial determinists, notwithstanding the apparent implausibility of par-
tial determinism). 
 76. Id. at 1155. 
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people raised in our culture are likely to think that determinism 
erodes their control over their actions, future, and destiny, depriving 
them of a culturally significant source of confidence and comfort.77
Moreover, determinism has particularly ugly political associations 
and resonances in our political culture, being popularly associated 
with paternalism and authoritarian governance.78 For reasons like 
these, people in our political culture may be strongly motivated to re-
ject determinism. And given the airy, abstract, speculative nature of 
the debate about determinism, most people can probably reject de-
terminism without believing that they are being “absurd” or “lying to 
themselves,” and without significant cognitive dissonance.79
 Even if compatibilist criminal theorists are correct that determin-
ism is true, then, it does not follow that those who have shaped and 
implemented our criminal justice institutions are determinists. In-
deed, it is much more likely that our criminal justice institutions op-
erate on the presumption that determinism is not true. If so, our pu-
nishment practices simply do not support the conclusion that our 
“real” intuitions are compatibilist. On the contrary, our punishment 
practices are entirely consistent with the widespread and influential 
originationist intuition.   
 Finally, compatibilists have often argued against incompatibilist 
intuitions by proposing that we can explain all of our blaming and 
excusing intuitions about specific wrongful acts without referring to 
“true” free will or origination. That is, we may think “true” free will 
and origination are central to our judgments about who to blame, but 
they really are not. The argument here generally begins by construct-
ing a list of the scenarios in which we typically excuse wrongful 
acts—the actor was insane, or intoxicated, or under duress, and so 
forth. At first glance, says the compatibilist, it may appear that the 
reason we excuse in these cases is because we see that the wrong-
doer’s act was determined (for example, by his mental illness, intoxi-
cation, or duress) such that he lacked “true” free will. But closer in-
spection shows that our excusing practices have nothing to do with 
determinism. Rather, we excuse because the actors in these sorts of 
cases lack some feature necessary for moral responsibility. For ex-
ample, they lack the capacity to engage in rational thought. If so, the 
compatibilist argues, concerns about “true” free will and origination 
play no role in our responsibility attributions. What matters is 
whether the actors have certain features, not whether they origi-
nated their acts.  
                                                                                                                                       
 77. Id.
 78. Id.
 79. Id. at 1142. 
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 There are, however, several problems with this approach. One 
problem is that our ability to construct an alternative, compatibilist 
explanation for our excusing practices does not show that the incom-
patibilist explanation is incorrect.80 The possibility of parallel expla-
nations does not disprove either of the parallels. More subtly, this 
approach appears to mistakenly assume that the originationist intui-
tion treats nonorigination as the only basis for excuse. In fact, noth-
ing in the originationist view precludes excusing actors for other rea-
sons (such as intellectual incapacity). The originationist intuition is 
not that nonorigination is the only basis for excuse; it is only that 
nonorigination is one of the bases for excuse.81 Finally, proponents of 
this approach have not yet successfully identified compatibilist ex-
planations for all the cases in which people are intuitively inclined to 
excuse apparently determined conduct. On the contrary, incompati-
bilist philosophers continue to identify scenarios in which many 
people have the intuition that the wrongdoer should be excused, ap-
parently just because the wrongdoer’s act was determined.82 To date, 
then, the alternative explanation approach has not successfully dis-
credited incompatibilist intuitions. Rather, these intuitions have 
proven stubborn and difficult to explain away.  
 None of this is to say, of course, that incompatibilist intuitions like 
the originationist intuition are bulletproof. These intuitions may yet 
be discredited. But it is fair to say that, to date, compatibilists have 
not yet inflicted a lethal blow on the originationist intuition. On the 
contrary, the originationist intuition persists tenaciously in the face 
of diverse challenges, a tribute to its stubborn strength. 
B.   How Originationist Intuitions Are Amplified by Findings in 
Behavioral Science 
 The originationist intuition, then, poses a significant problem for 
the compatibilist move and thus for responsibility itself. The 
behavioral sciences magnify this problem, for the same behavioral 
science findings that suggest determinism also dramatically amplify 
our originationist intuitions. To show that this is so, I first explain 
how particularistic details can have a significant influence on 
intuitions about responsibility, and how this has played to the 
advantage of compatibilists in contemporary debates about 
determinism and responsibility. I then turn to the special impact of 
behavioral science particulars, which I contend amplify our 
originationist intuitions in a way that the compatibilist move is not 
tailored to counter.   
                                                                                                                                       
 80. Kaye, Causal Theory, supra note 41, at 1142. 
 81. See Kaye, Secret Politics, supra note 41, at 373.  
 82. See, e.g., Pereboom, Determinism al Dente, supra note 41, at 248-49. 
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1.   The Power of the Particular in Intuitions About Responsibility 
 Moral intuitions usually explored at high levels of abstraction can 
look quite different when tested with particularistic examples and 
hypotheticals. The recent debates between compatibilists and 
incompatibilists show that this is true of intuitions about 
responsibility and determinism, which are highly susceptible to the 
power of the particular.83
 Illustrations of this can be found throughout the literature on 
responsibility. For example, as philosopher Manuel Vargas reports, 
recent empirical research suggests that manipulating abstraction and 
detail in hypotheticals about “determined” wrongful acts influences our 
intuitions about blaming determined wrongful actors.84 When presented 
with hypotheticals in which the determined wrongful act is described in 
abstract terms, people tend to express incompatibilist intuitions; they 
indicate that blaming the determined actor seems wrong. In contrast, 
when considering wrongful acts that have been described in “concrete 
and affect-provoking” detail, people tend to express compatibilist 
intuitions; they indicate that blaming the determined actor is 
appropriate.85 In other words, manipulating the level of detail in the 
description of the wrongdoing significantly influences subjects’ moral 
intuitions about blaming determined wrongdoers.86
 This phenomenon has played a subtle but important role in the 
debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Proponents of 
                                                                                                                                       
 83. A.J. Ayer suggested something similar in an early criticism of Peter Strawson’s 
reactive attitude argument. A.J. Ayer, Free Will and Rationality, in FREE WILL AND 
REACTIVE ATTITUDES 37, 42-43 (Michael McKenna & Paul Russell eds., 2008). Strawson 
argued that the reactive attitudes that sustain our blaming practices would survive proof 
of determinism because they are central to human nature and society. Ayer suggested that 
Strawson’s claim becomes less plausible if we flesh out determinism in more concrete de-
tail. Id. For example, if we knew that our society implanted our “desires and beliefs and 
traits” through something like Skinnerian conditioning, “if it were a matter of common 
knowledge that these methods were practised, and if we understood the ways in which they 
operated,” then we would abandon the participant-reactive attitudes. Id. at 43. Others 
have made similar points. See, e.g., Jonathan Bennett, Accountability (II), in FREE WILL 
AND REACTIVE ATTITUDES 47, 67 (Michael McKenna & Paul Russell eds., 2008) (noting that 
we are generally much more moved by thinking about harm to an “identified person [than 
to] an unidentified group”—concrete details have a stronger pull on our reactions).  
 84. Vargas, Folk, supra note 57, at 250. 
 85. Id. at 241 (“In cases where the descriptions are concrete and affect-provoking, we 
tend to opt for compatibilist conditions. In cases that are described more abstractly and 
that appear to involve less affect, we favor incompatibilist . . . analyses.”).   
 86. Id. at 248 (“The experimental work yields a . . . lesson important for philosophers 
working in this domain. . . . [W]e should very carefully attend to how our own reactions to 
various thought experiments . . . might be a function of high-affect triggers . . . of judgment. 
. . . [I]f you want your thought experiment to elicit compatibilist intuitions, you would do 
well to frame the example in terms that trigger emotional reactions, reactions whose pres-
ence tends to strongly favor compatibilist reactions. The reverse is true for incompatibil-
ists.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 249 (speculating that “the more concrete and emotionally-
laden a . . . case is made to be, the higher the rate at which people will want to ascribe 
moral responsibility.”).   
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compatibilism have sometimes employed the power of the particular 
in their efforts to show that blaming determined actors is consistent 
with our moral intuitions about responsibility. For example, they 
have asked us to reflect upon our intuitions about cases of 
wrongdoing in which the wrongful act is described in vivid, specific 
detail. Such detailed descriptions tend to catalyze intense reactions 
in us. Their awful facts trigger powerful, visceral indignation, 
resentment, anger, and fear, and these reactions in turn feed directly 
into punitive moral attitudes. The compatibilist also offers a 
potential causal explanation for the wrongdoing, but presents it quite 
abstractly and with very little detail. Sometimes the compatibilist 
suggests that the wrongdoer’s act was caused by a hard life or 
parental abuse.87 Sometimes, the deterministic explanation is 
relegated to total abstraction—the compatibilist merely grants or 
assumes arguendo that determinism is true, and offers no details 
whatsoever as to what particular causes were implicated in the 
wrongdoing. Typical reactions to these generalities tend to be muted 
and amorphous. With these pieces in place—a  particularly described 
wrongdoing and an highly abstract causal explanation—the 
compatibilist then asks us whether knowing about the causal 
explanation dissipates our punitive attitudes toward the wrongdoer. 
Generally, it does not; we remain viscerally punitive even when we 
are presented with the causal explanation.88 At the level of our moral 
intuitions, then, responsibility and determinism must be compatible. 
 Incompatibilists use particulars in a mirror image fashion to make 
the opposite point. Like the compatibilists, they seek to persuade us 
by inviting us to reflect upon our intuitions about cases of determined 
wrongdoing. But in their cases, the wrongdoing is described 
abstractly (they posit that a person has done something wrong, but 
label the wrong in a generic and abstract way), while the causal 
explanation for the wrongdoing is fleshed out in more substantial 
detail.89 Not surprisingly, their example plays differently in our 
                                                                                                                                       
 87. For example, Moore discusses “the sympathy we may feel for wrongdoers whose 
wrongdoing was caused by factors such as social adversity or psychological abuse during 
childhood,” but does not go further to flesh out what relationship those factors might have 
to wrongdoings. MOORE, supra note 26, at 544. 
 88. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 26, at 145 (describing Richard Herrin’s murder of 
Bonnie Garland by asking us to imagine “it was you who had intentionally smashed open 
the skull of a 23-year-old woman with a claw hammer whiles she was asleep, a woman 
whose fatal defect was a desire to free herself from your too clinging embrace?”); id at 148 
(juxtaposing Herrin’s horrible crime with reasons that might make us question propriety of 
blaming him, including that “he grew up in the barrio of East Los Angeles” and “found Yale 
an alien and disorienting culture”); id. at 148-49 (observing that our feelings about Herrin’s 
crime – even taking into account his background – support holding him responsible).  
 89. See, e.g., Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 33 (describing the wrongful act in a 
three word phrase—“strangl[ing] several persons”—while the (Freudian) causal explana-
tion takes up about half a page). 
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intuitions. The abstractly described wrongdoing does not move us in 
the way that the compatibilist’s vividly described wrongdoing did, but 
the concrete and specific details in the causal explanation give the 
deterministic mechanism a heft and significance it did not have 
before. Now it is the deterministic explanation that provokes a 
visceral reaction. Its details engage our attention and imagination 
more fully, inviting extended reflection and exploration, such that we 
become more likely to contemplate and explore the potential 
problems with holding the determined actor responsible. At the 
intuitive level, the vivid causal explanation tends to blot out the 
amorphous generic wrongdoing, and pushes us toward the 
incompatibilist view.90       
 Gary Watson’s influential article on the reactive attitudes nicely 
illustrates these dynamics.91 Watson presents a highly detailed 
account of a double murder and speculates (correctly, I believe) that 
the account evokes outrage and horror in most readers .92 For 
example, reading that the killer told two hostages they were free to 
go, then shot them in the back as they walked away, we are likely to 
vividly imagine the hostages’ experience—their terrible anxiety, the 
glimmerings of hope, the sudden terrible shattering of that hope.93
Similarly, reading that the killer’s brother watched the killer 
consume a hamburger taken from one of the victims just a little while 
after the killing,94 we stand in the observing brother’s shoes, sharing 
in one brother’s horror at the other brother’s callousness.95 And, 
learning that the killer fantasized about posing as a police officer and 
personally telling the victims’ parents about the killings,96 we see him 
through the eyes of those parents, sharing in the grief and 
denigration they would feel if he confronted them. The details in the 
story make the killer’s acts vivid for us; they induce us to visualize 
the gruesome events, place ourselves at the frightening scene, and 
                                                                                                                                       
 90. See, e.g., Pereboom, Determinism al Dente, supra note 41, at 245 (describing a hy-
pothetical crime as follows: “Mr. Green kills Ms. Peacock for the sake of some personal ad-
vantage”); id at 246-48 (offering several variations on the case in which the causal explana-
tion for Mr. Green’s crime is set out in considerably more detail, and suggesting in each 
case that our intuition is that Mr. Green is not responsible for the crime).  
 91. GARY WATSON, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian 
Theme, in AGENCY AND ANSWERABILITY: SELECTED ESSAYS 219-59 (Gary Watson ed.,  
2d ed. 2004).  
 92. Id. at 235-38 (quoting Miles Corwin, Icy Killer’s Life Steeped in Violence, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (May 16, 1982)).  
 93. Indeed, cognitive psychology teaches that this scenario will elicit especially power-
ful feelings in us, for it juxtaposes a terrible outcome with an easily imagined counterfac-
tual in which tragedy is averted. Such “near miss” cases have an especially powerful im-
pact on our feelings. 
 94. Id. at 236. 
 95. As Watson notes, the killer’s brother “became nauseated and ran to the bath-
room.” Id. (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).  
 96. Id. at 237. 
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identify with the deceived and despairing victims. Our reactions to 
the story have the force and heft of a strong personal, imaginative, 
and emotional engagement with a terrible wrong, and these in turn 
are a potent fuel for powerfully punitive reactive attitudes. As 
Watson puts it, “[w]e respond to his heartlessness and viciousness 
with moral outrage and loathing”;97 he seems the “ ‘archetypal 
candidate’ for blame.”98
 Having presented a particularistic account of the wrongdoing, 
Watson then drops the other shoe, giving extensive detail about the 
killer’s horrific formative experiences.99 Now Watson speculates 
(again correctly, I think) that our punitive reactions will be 
dampened.100 According to Watson’s story, the killer was born nearly 
three months premature after his father assaulted his pregnant 
mother, accusing her of infidelity.101 During his childhood, his 
alcoholic father often beat him, inflicting serious injury.102 His 
mother, in turn, was “never able to love him.”103 His birth had caused 
her permanent pain and injury, and his father constantly abused her, 
and as a result she “turned . . . against her son.”104 She blamed him 
for “all of her problems [and came to] hate” him.105 A sister 
remembered that when he was little, 
[h]e wanted love so bad he would beg for any kind of physical 
contact. He’d come up to my mother and just try to rub his little 
hands on her leg or her arm. . . . She’d just push him away or kick 
him. One time she bloodied his nose when he was trying to get 
close to her.106
By the time he was fourteen, he was in federal detention, where he 
was “raped several times” and “slashed his wrists twice in suicide 
attempts.”107 Over time, his sister “saw every grain of sweetness, pity 
and goodness in him destroyed . . . .”108
 Again, as the story unfolds, we are drawn in. Now we stand in the 
shoes of the little boy, feeling some of the fear and confusion and pain 
he felt when his father attacked him and when he saw his father 
attack his mother. Now we imagine how it felt to be so completely 
(and violently) rejected by his mother, how the rejection must have 
                                                                                                                                       
 97. Id. at 238. 
 98. Id.
 99. Id. at  239-42 (quoting Corwin, supra note 92). 
 100. Id. at 242. 
 101. Id. at 240-41 (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).  
 102. Id.
 103. Id. at 240 (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).  
 104. Id. (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).  
 105. Id. (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).  
 106. Id. at 240-41 (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).  
 107. Id. at 241 (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).  
 108. Id. at 239 (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).  
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engendered heart-rending despair, how it slowly corroded the 
“sweetness, pity, and goodness in him.”109 Now we begin to piece 
together a puzzle: the boy’s parents hurt him in the deepest way a 
person can be hurt; at the same time, they taught him sadistic 
violence and cruelty; so when the boy became strong enough to do so, 
he punished the world for the intolerable pain his parents caused 
him by engaging in the sadistic destruction they taught him. We feel 
sympathy for the killer and perhaps come to see him as a victim 
himself.110 We understand that “it could have been me”—that we 
might have done terrible things if we had been exposed to the 
astonishing formative influences the killer was exposed to.111 The 
concrete and particular details have catalyzed a deep, textured, and 
careful reflective process, and the now vibrant causal story eats away 
at the impulse to blame. The experience pushes against our initial 
punitive reactions, nudging us back toward incompatibilism.112     
 In this way, intuitions about responsibility and determinism are 
highly susceptible to particularism. The more particularly we see a 
wrongdoing or the causal explanation for that wrongdoing, the more 
likely we are to engage the wrongdoing or the causal explanation in 
the sort of active, imaginative, exploratory way that brings it into 
contact with our most deep-seated aversions, desires, fears, hopes, 
and values. Vivid facts awaken moral sensitivity. This is why (or part 
of why) particularistic examples can amplify moral intuitions in such 
striking ways. Watson himself signals this when, in the course of 
providing two long, detailed excerpts regarding the double murder, 
he “ask[s] for the reader’s patience” on the ground that “[i]t is very 
important here to work with realistic and detailed examples.”113
Though Watson does not explain why this is very important, a very 
plausible explanation is that detail influences our moral intuitions 
regarding determined wrongdoing in a significant way. 
                                                                                                                                       
 109. Id. (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).  
 110. See id. at 244-45. 
 111. Id. at 245-46. 
 112. Id. at 242-43. Other philosophers point to the same insights Watson does. Jona-
than Bennett, for example, who traces our blaming practice to our reactive attitudes, notes 
that “one can dispel a hostile reactive feeling by cultivating objectivity of attitude towards 
the offender.” Bennett, supra note 83, at 53. In his view, “[t]o adopt the objective attitude 
towards something is to inquire into how it is structured and/or how it functions.” Id. And 
his impression is that once one begins to have “naturalistic thoughts” about conduct, to 
have “intense thoughts about the causes,” the “affront ceases to be an offence. . . .” Id. at 
58. He suggests that such naturalistic thoughts are “psychologically immiscible” with 
blaming attitudes, so that the more we look at the causes, the less we are inclined to 
blame. Id. at 57. “I cannot imagine,” he writes, “anyone thinking hard about the causation 
of behavior while continuing to boil with rage against the malefactor.” Id. at 58. One way to 
understand this is in terms of the power of the particular: perhaps the reason that objec-
tive, cause-focused thinking is so destructive to blaming attitudes is that such thinking 
necessarily involves deep involvement with particularistic detail. 
 113. WATSON, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil, supra note 91, at 238 n.14.   
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2.   Compatibilism’s Traditional Particularism Advantage 
 Watson’s examples also highlight something else important about 
the role of the particular in the debate between compatibilists and 
incompatibilists. While compatibilists and incompatibilists can both 
use particulars to advance their causes, compatibilists have generally 
had it easier when it comes to generating favorable particularistic 
examples. This is a function of the difference between the phenomena 
the two sides seek to bring to life.   
 For the compatibilist, the primary goal is to bring his audience 
into deep engagement with the wrongdoer’s wrongful act and its 
awful consequences. The deeper and more complex this engagement, 
the more likely we are to have strong emotional and moral reactions 
to the wrongful act, and the more likely those reactions are to include 
reactions commonly associated with blaming, like outrage, disgust, 
fear, and anger. Thus, capitalizing on the power of the particular 
means, for the compatibilist, describing the wrongdoer’s wrongful act 
itself. And, as Watson’s example suggests, this is something we 
rarely have trouble doing. A wrongful act is typically a discrete 
human act that can be seen or visualized easily. There are only a few 
human beings involved (the wrongdoer, a victim, and so on); the 
wrongdoer engages in a relatively simple sequence of physical 
movements (points the gun, pulls the trigger, etc.); those movements 
occur in a relatively short period of time (a shooting takes a few 
seconds; a bank robbery takes several minutes); its effects usually 
manifest almost immediately (the bullet enters the chest and causes 
death) and in easily described ways (the victim was killed, his leg 
was broken, she was terrified); and its most important further 
consequences are easy to describe and imagine (e.g., loved ones feel 
sorrow at the loss). In short, it is easy to set out a realistic, detailed, 
and engaging description of a bad act and its most important 
consequences. And, needless to say, this is especially easy for 
criminal theorists. After all, we are immersed in a law saturated with 
meticulously documented and elaborately articulated accounts of 
injury, cruelty, and wrong—our criminal law casebooks and reporters 
are full of them. Thus, mobilizing the power of the particular to elicit 
and augment intuitions conducive to compatibilism has never been a 
difficult task.   
 On the other side of the coin, incompatibilists face a more difficult 
challenge, for they are tasked with representing a very different sort 
of phenomenon. In order to capitalize on the power of the particular, 
the incompatibilist must induce his audience into deep engagement 
with the causes of the wrongdoer’s act. If he can lay out a concrete, 
realistic, and detailed account of the causes of a wrongful act, he can 
induce his audience to engage with those causes emotionally, thereby 
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catalyzing emotional reactions like the sympathetic and empathic 
reactions that Watson described. If he can offer such a particularistic 
account he can catalyze careful reflection on the moral significance of 
the particular causes involved—such as the reflections about fairness 
and moral luck Watson described. Thus, for the incompatibilist, 
capitalizing on the power of the particular means describing in 
concrete, realistic detail the causes of the wrongdoer’s wrong.   
 The problem for the incompatibilist is that telling a credible, 
detailed story about the causes of a wrongdoing has traditionally 
been much harder then telling a similar story about the wrong itself. 
It is much more difficult to see the causal machinery behind an act 
than it is to see the act itself. In most cases, the causes of wrongful 
acts are exceedingly complex; they are yoked together in long, 
branching causal chains that disappear into the murky past. They 
include all those things that shape our choices and wills—all those 
things that give us our distinctive balance of preferences, desires, 
values, traits, dispositions, capacities, and impairments. They 
include a lifetime’s incremental accumulation of pains and pleasures, 
opportunities and pressures, formative and reinforcing experiences. 
They involve many human actors (parents, siblings, other family, 
friends, teachers, and so on) acting in diverse settings (the home, the 
school, the playground, the workplace, etc.), sometimes operating 
directly on the actor (through direct encounters and communication) 
and sometimes indirectly (for example, through media products or 
institutional policies that influence the actor). At the same time, they 
include the almost always invisible and complex genetic and 
physiological determinants of the actor’s traits, preferences, 
capacities, and impairments. They include environmental 
phenomena—brute physical conditions, economic circumstances, 
cultural institutions—that can be extraordinarily complex and 
equally subtle. And a credible causal account must not only catalog 
the relevant causes, but also make accessible the complex 
interactions between them, and their relationships to the act 
ultimately caused. As a result, it is exceedingly difficult to offer a 
passably credible causal account of a human act. It is more plausibly 
attempted in a novel114 or a biography than a philosopher’s 
hypothetical. This may be why so much of the incompatibilist 
literature revolves around hypotheticals in which nefarious demons, 
magicians, and super-scientists cause people to act, or in which 
                                                                                                                                       
 114. For an especially ambitious example of a novel perhaps attempting a partial con-
struction of the causal history of a wrongful act, see JOSEPH HELLER, SOMETHING
HAPPENED (2d. ed. 1974).   
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androids are constructed to act in certain ways.115 These strange 
fantasies stand in as enormously simplified symbols for real human 
actors moved by immensely complex real causal mechanisms. In 
short, telling credible particularistic stories about the causes of 
wrongful acts has always been dramatically more difficult than 
telling similar stories about the acts themselves.
 What this suggests is that compatibilists have generally had the 
distinct advantage in telling stories that capitalize on the power of 
the particular. In order to use particulars to summon blame-
favorable reactions, the compatibilist need only particularistically 
describe a wrongdoing itself. Her task is to describe an event that 
occurred in a short time frame, in a discrete physical location, 
involving a few steps and easy to describe consequences. The 
incompatibilist, in contrast, has a much more difficult task. In order 
to use particulars to summon blame-opposing reactions, she must 
offer a particularistic account of the causal forces and circumstances 
that led to the act. Her task is to plumb the murky depths of a 
person’s history, to trace back numerous causal chains, to collect all 
the countless and diverse incremental nudges and pushes that 
produced the wrongful act, and to show how they worked together to 
produce the deed. This is a very daunting task. 
 Particulars, then, play an important role in debates about 
responsibility. Properly selected particulars induce us to reflect on 
wrongful acts or their causes in a deeply engaged, textured, and 
personal way, and this can be a potent catalyst for intuitions about 
blame. It can amp up blame-supporting intuitions, or cultivate 
blame-opposing intuitions. But this powerful tool has not always 
been equally accessible to the participants in the debate about 
responsibility. On the contrary, it has traditionally been much easier 
for compatibilists to use the power of the particular than it has  
for incompatibilists.  
3.   Behavioral Science Particulars and the Originationist Intuition 
 Against this backdrop, the real significance of the behavioral 
science challenge can emerge. The power of that challenge does not 
lie in the way the behavioral sciences suggest that determinism is 
true, but in the way that the behavioral sciences bring determinism 
to life. Offering an ever-growing library of material to integrate into 
concrete, detailed descriptions of the causes of human acts, the 
behavioral sciences help incompatibilists narrow the particularlism 
gap with compatibilists.   
                                                                                                                                       
 115. See, e.g., Pereboom, Determinism al Dente, supra note 41, at 246-47 (offering hy-
potheticals in which “Mr. Green is like an ordinary human being, except that he was 
created by neuroscientists . . .”). 
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 To illustrate, I offer three examples from scholarship grappling 
with wrongdoing and responsibility. In each case, the theorist raises 
doubts about responsibility for wrongdoing and relies to a substantial 
degree on the behavioral sciences. In all three cases, the standard 
rebuttal is that the science cited does not establish determinism, and 
that even if it does, responsibility can be salvaged by making the 
compatibilist move. As I hope to highlight, however, rebuttals along 
these traditional lines miss the real strength of these theorists’ 
arguments, which does not lie in the intimations of determinism, but 
in the particularistic stories the theorists tell along the way. Each of 
these theorists makes extensive use of the behavioral sciences to 
flesh out particularized stories about caused human action, and in 
each case this revitalizes our originationist intuitions and (thus) our 
incompatibilist sense that there is something wrong with attributing 
responsibility to wrongdoers in a determined world.  
(a)   Hospers’ Freudian Stories 
 Consider, first, how philosopher John Hospers used Freudian 
ideas to challenge attributions of responsibility in the middle of the 
last century. Hospers was especially interested in Freud’s theories 
about “unconscious motivation,”116 from which Hospers took the view 
that “the unconscious is the master of every fate and the captain of 
every soul.”117 As he explained, “[t]he conscious life of the human 
being, including the conscious decisions and volitions, is merely a 
mouthpiece for the unconscious”;118 “our very acts of volition, and the 
entire train of deliberations leading up to them, are but facades for 
the expression of unconscious . . .  compromises and defenses.”119 Per 
Freud, these compromises and defenses could, in turn, be traced to 
“unconscious conflicts developed in infancy”120 and to tensions 
between the id, ego, and superego:  
There is a Big Three behind the scenes which the automaton called 
the conscious personality carries out: the id, an “eternal gimmie,” 
presents its wish and demands . . . satisfaction; the superego says 
no to the wish immediately upon presentation, and the 
unconscious ego, the mediator between the two, tries to keep peace 
by means of compromise.121     
                                                                                                                                       
 116. Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 26; see also Hospers, Psychoanalysis, supra
note 12, at 465. 
 117. Hospers, Psychoanalysis, supra note 12, at 471. 
 118. Id. at 465. 
 119. Id. at 466. 
 120. Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 26. 
 121. Hospers, Psychoanalysis, supra note 12, at 465. 
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These psychic dynamics, he said, were the true “genesis of criminal 
actions.”122 “[W]ithout their own knowledge”  many criminal offenders 
act out “fantasies, fears, and defenses from early childhood, over whose 
coming and going they have no conscious control.”123 In many cases, 
their crimes, which may seem deliberate and carefully planned, are 
actually driven by “overwhelming impulse[s] . . . stemming from an 
unusually humiliating ego defeat in early childhood.”124   
 Hospers contended that this account of unconscious motivation 
posed a threat to responsibility. To his eyes, Freud’s theories 
suggested that each person’s actions “grow out of his character, 
which is shaped and molded and made what it is by influences—some 
hereditary, but most of them stemming from early parental 
environment—that were not of his own making or choosing.”125 Many 
wrongdoers, he said, “are passive, not active—they are victims of a 
neurotic conflict.”126 And if this is right, he asked, “How can anyone 
be responsible for his actions . . . ?”127
 Critics have read Hospers to be making the traditional 
determinist argument against responsibility. To their eyes, his 
argument is that Freudian theory helps show that human acts are 
determined, and that human actors are therefore not responsible for 
their acts. Having interpreted Hospers’ project this way, the critics 
then refute him on both fronts. Characterizing Freudian theory as 
dubious and Hospers’ use of that theory as naive, they argue that 
Hospers has given us no good reason to believe determinism is true. 
In addition, they make the compatibilist move, arguing that even if 
determinism is true, we can be responsible for determined acts, and 
that nothing in Hospers’ account of unconscious motivations actually 
strips us of the features we must have to be responsible actors. Even 
if we are driven by such motivations, we can still engage in practical 
reasoning, recognize reasons for and against what we do, and so on.128    
 Such arguments, however, ignore an important dimension of 
Hospers’ project. While Hospers was impressed with Freud, he did 
not mean to use Freud to prove determinism.129 Instead, Freudianism 
was just the starter for an imaginative exploration of the causes of 
wrongful acts. Consider, for example, how Hospers used Freudian 
ideas in two accounts of human wrongdoing. In the first, he discusses 
a hypothetical murderer: 
                                                                                                                                       
 122. Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 27. 
 123. Id.
 124. Id. at 29.  
 125. Id. at 32.  
 126. Hospers, Psychoanalysis, supra note 12 at 470.  
 127. Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 32. 
 128. See, e.g., Moore, Causation, supra note 62, at 1130-31 (making compatibilist move 
in critique of Hospers).   
 129. Id. at 41 (“I want to make it quite clear that I have not been arguing for determinism.”).  
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Let us take as an example a criminal [who commits several 
murders] . . . . [N]ow we find out how it all came about; we learn of 
parents who rejected him from babyhood, of the childhood spent in 
one foster home after another, where it was always plain to him 
that he was not wanted; of the constantly frustrated early desire 
for affection, the hard shell of nonchalance and bitterness that he 
assumed to cover the painful and humiliating fact of being 
unwanted, and his subsequent attempts to heal these wounds to 
his shattered ego through defensive aggression. . . . “The criminal . 
. . tr[ies] to wreak revenge on the mother of the earliest period of 
his babyhood; his criminality is based on the inner feeling of being 
incapable of making the mother even feel that the child seeks 
revenge on her. . . . [T]he primary inner aim of forcing the giant to 
acknowledge the dwarf’s fury is fulfilled.”130
 In the second account, Hospers reports about a (not hypothetical) 
boy “sentenced to prison for the murder of a girl.”131 He recounts that 
the boy’s “parental background includes records of drunkenness, 
divorce, social maladjustment, [and] paresis,” and that “[t]he boy [at 
an early age] displayed a tendency toward sadistic activity to hide an 
underlying masochism and to ‘prove that he’s a man’; being coddled 
by his mother only worsens this tendency, until, spurned by a girl in 
his attempt on her, he kills her . . . .”132
 In each of these cases, Hospers has framed the discussion by 
invoking the Freudian unconscious, but it should be clear that the 
story he tells is only partly and loosely a Freudian story. There are 
references to shattered ego, buried childhood conflict, and neurosis; 
but there are also references to ideas more likely to be found in the 
sociology and ethnography of crime—poor and absent parenting, 
loneliness and rejection, and pent-up frustration vented in violence. 
Indeed, Hospers’ own discussion acknowledges that the Freudian 
details in his account might best be thought of as imaginative stand-
ins for whatever is really at work: he ruminates that there “may . . . 
be . . . some combination of factors” that leads to murder, factors still 
to be “discovered.”133 The Freudian elements of his story, then, are 
but part of a bigger project.   
 A central piece of that bigger project involves bringing determined 
action to life so that we will engage it in a deep and searching way. 
Hospers offers his Freudian accounts not as facts, but as 
illustrations—stand-ins or representations of better causal 
explanations we may someday have. Their value, then, does not lie in 
their ability to prove that determinism is true; rather, it lies in the 
                                                                                                                                       
 130. Id. at 33 (quoting EDMUND BERGLER, THE BASIC NEUROSIS 305 (1949). 
 131. Hospers, Psychoanalysis, supra note 12, at 465.  
 132. Id.
 133. Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 34.  
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way they induce us to imagine and engage with the causes of 
determined action. His Freudian accounts role model particularistic 
explanation. They show us how we might look back through time to 
connect formative events to wrongful acts and alert us that the 
connections can be conceived in concrete, mechanical ways. In so 
doing, they prove Hospers’ more fundamental point: “[T]he more 
thoroughly and in detail we know the causal factors . . . , the more we 
tend to exempt [the wrongdoer] from responsibility.”134     
 Once we see that Hospers is less concerned with the Freudian 
proof of determinism than he is with the power of the particularism 
that Freudianism role models, we can see that Hospers uses 
Freudian causal explanations to much the same effect that Watson 
used his killer’s personal history. For example, as Watson did, 
Hospers uses detailed claims about the offenders’ formative 
experiences to bring us back to childhood, highlighting for us the 
ways in which the offenders were once vulnerable and sympathetic 
figures. This, in turn, encourages us to see the wrongdoers as 
malleable (at the mercy of formative forces beyond their control) and 
as victims (of wretched parenting, ego defeat, and an unfortunate 
confluence of uninvited circumstances), so that we empathize with 
them and feel compassion toward them. In a similar vein, by 
cataloging a set of distinctive formative forces in the criminal’s life, 
Hospers (like Watson) enables us to imagine what the wrongdoer 
might have been like without those formative influences—to see that 
removing those perverting forces might leave a “normal” person. In 
so doing, his examples invite us to identify with the wrongdoer, and 
thus to give up feelings of difference and “moral superiority”135 that 
fuel blame. At the same time, Hospers’ Freudian stories also tap into 
the fairness concerns that Watson uncovered. For example, Freud’s 
emphasis on the parental role in the formation of unconscious 
conflicts makes us wonder if blaming the offender is blaming the 
wrong person—perhaps his parents should be blamed instead?136
Likewise, seeing the various powerful forces involved in shaping the 
psyche, we worry that plucking the wrongful actor out of the causal 
web is essentially arbitrary. And seeing how much variability there is 
in the formative experiences people encounter, we are sensitized to 
the extraordinary role that luck plays in who does wrong: “Someone 
commits a crime and is punished by the state; ‘he deserved it,’ we say 
. . .  as if we were moral and he immoral, when in fact we are lucky 
                                                                                                                                       
 134. Id. at 35.  
 135. Id. at 34.  
 136. Hospers saw that we might have this impulse (to shift the focus of blame from 
wrongdoer to parent) and warned that resting blame on the parent would be equally mis-
guided (for the reason that the parent, too, is the product of forces and circumstances he 
cannot control). Id. at 36. 
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and he is unlucky—forgetting that there, but for the grace of God and 
a fortunate early environment, go we.”137
 If there is power in Hospers’ Freudian stories, then, it is the same 
power that Watson uncovered in his seminal essay. It does not depend 
upon the truth of Freud’s particular claims, but on the insights that 
emerge from the process of imagining the particular causes of wrongful 
acts. Hospers’ Freudian stories pull us into determinism and induce us 
to imagine what it means to be determined. In so doing, they activate 
deep fairness concerns and powerful empathic attitudes—concerns and 
attitudes that amplify our originationist intuitions and put significant 
pressure on blaming intuitions.   
 Hospers is not, then, arguing that the route from Freud to 
determinism to the end of responsibility is a simple one, like a 
subway ride from one stop to another. Rather, he weaves Freud’s 
ideas into his argument as threads in a diverse tapestry; bits of 
causal detail that work with other causal details to fill out a vision of 
what it means to be a determined actor. He is capitalizing on their 
granularity, recognizing that when we imagine and engage discrete 
details about determined acts, we shift from the bird’s-eye view of 
those acts to the view on the ground. Now we empathize and identify 
with the determined actor. Now we feel sympathy and compassion. 
Now it seems unfair that so much depends on luck. Now it seems 
perverse to treat the actor as though he were a freestanding monad 
rather than the intersection of countless causal chains. As we 
imagine the causes of determined wrongdoing particularistically, the 
concerns that drive the originationist intuition come to life, 
amplifying the originationist intuition and putting new pressure on 
our initial inclination to blame the wrongdoer.      
 In this light, critiquing Hospers for his reliance on or 
misunderstanding of Freud misses the most powerful feature of 
Hospers’ work. While Hospers’ thesis is that insights from Freudian 
theory suggest that we are not responsible actors, his argument does 
not rest primarily on the premises that Freudian theory proves 
determinism or that this alone threatens responsibility. Rather, he 
uses Freudian theory to model particularistic visions of caused 
human action, showing how those detail-infused accounts bring 
                                                                                                                                       
 137. Id. at 41. Or, as he puts it, while talking about why some people can overcome the 
urge to be a spendthrift, “[S]ome people do. They are lucky. They have it in them to over-
come early deficiencies by exerting great effort . . . . Some of us, luckier still, can overcome 
them with but little effort; and a few, the luckiest, haven’t the deficiencies to overcome. It’s 
all a matter of luck.” Id. at 39. Likewise, “[w]hat about the children who turn out ‘all right’? 
All we can say is that ‘it’s just lucky for them’ that what happened to their unfortunate 
brother didn’t happen to them . . . The machine turned them out with a minimum of dam-
age. . . Some of us are lucky enough not to have a gambling-neurosis or criminotic tenden-
cies or masochistic mother-attachment or overdimensional repetition-compulsion to make 
our lives miserable . . . .” Hospers, Psychoanalysis, supra note 12, at 471-72. 
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determinism to life, recharge the originationist intuition, and thereby 
undermine traditional accounts of responsibility.  
(b)   Stories About Toxic Social Conditions 
 Freudian stories are relatively rare in criminal theory today, but 
stories drawing on other behavioral sciences are more common. 
Perhaps the most common are stories grounded in the sociology and 
psychology of toxic social conditions.138 Theorists presenting these 
stories typically recount findings in sociology and psychology that 
suggest strong connections between toxic social conditions like poverty, 
socioeconomic inequality, and racism and important social problems 
like crime, violence, and wrongdoing. Given these findings, the theorist 
suggests, we ought to reconsider who we hold responsible.     
 Consider, in this regard, Patricia Falk’s discussion of “social 
toxins.”139 Falk proposes that the law should more fully credit certain 
sorts of criminal defenses—namely, defenses grounded in the 
defendant’s exposure to social toxins like violent environment (“real-
life violence”),140 media violence, and racism.141 In support of this 
view, she describes social science research regarding the “effects of 
real-life violence” on children who witness that violence.142 She 
explains as follows:  
 Firsthand exposure to violence may result in full-blown 
psychiatric disorders. The most common [being] . . .  Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder. . . .143
 . . . .  
 . . . [A] number of other psychiatric disorders may also 
result. . . .144
 . . . .  
 In addition . . .  exposure to real-life violence can lead to . . .  
emotional problems such as depression and anxiety; cognitive and 
developmental impairment . . .  and behavioral outcomes including 
suicide and violence directed toward others.145
 . . . [T]he effects of violence on children may be especially 
deleterious. . . . [and] may arrest or impair developmental 
processes with long-term consequences. . . .146
                                                                                                                                       
 138. The seminal example in legal academic literature is Delgado, supra note 6.
 139. Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of the 
Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C.L. 
REV. 731, 731 (1996).   
 140. Id. at 758. 
 141. Id. at 758. Falk describes community violence, violence in media, and racism as 
among the “most pervasive and damaging” social toxins. Id. at 735. 
 142. Id. at 758. 
 143. Id. at 759.  
 144. Id. at 761. 
 145. Id. at 762 (footnotes omitted).  
 146. Id. at 762-63. 
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 . . . [T]he phenomenon of chronic violence may be more 
psychologically devastating than discrete episodes . . . [and may 
lead to] “alterations of personality, and major changes in patterns 
of behavior or articulations of ideological interpretations of the 
world that provide a framework for making sense of ongoing 
danger . . . .”147
 “ . . . Being abused as a child may increase one’s risk for 
becoming an abusive parent, a delinquent, or an adult violent 
criminal. . . .”148
 One possible causal explanation for violent behavior on the part 
of those exposed to violence is social learning theory, which 
suggests that children learn or model the behavior that they 
observe. A second explanation is a variant of the frustration-
aggression hypothesis. Frustration when combined with highly 
salient aggression cues may result in violence.149
Building on this summary of the relevant social science, Falk 
suggests that novel “defense theories [including] urban psychosis . . .  
may be accommodated within existing categories of criminal defense 
and mitigation.”150 To her eyes, then, these social science findings 
diminish responsibility in some cases of wrongdoing.   
 One reading of Falk’s social science argument pigeonholes it as a 
traditional deterministic argument in which Falk maintains that the 
social sciences prove determinism and that this calls responsibility 
into question. After all, Falk sometimes implies that the social 
sciences provide causal explanations for wrongful acts: “exposure to 
real-life violence can lead to [certain] behavioral outcomes . . . “151;
parental abuse “increase[s] one’s risk . . .” for criminal conduct152;
“social learning theory . . . [and the] . . . “frustration-aggression 
hypothesis”153 provide “causal explanation[s] for violent behavior on 
the part of those exposed to violence . . . .”154 Perhaps this attention to 
causation suggests she is using the social sciences to paint a 
deterministic picture of criminal conduct. 
 But this reading of Falk’s argument mistakes the trees for the 
forest. In fact, Falk is not much interested in using the social sciences 
to prove that determinism is true. Indeed, she acknowledges that 
“[t]he empirical and theoretical . . .  support” for the various social 
                                                                                                                                       
 147. Id. at 763 (quoting James Garbarino et al., What Children Can Tell Us About Liv-
ing in Danger, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 376, 377 (1991)). 
 148. Id. at 763-64 (quoting Cathy Spatz Widom, Does Violence Beget Violence?: A Criti-
cal Examination of Literature, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 24 (1989)).  
 149. Id. at 764 (footnotes omitted).  
 150. Id. at 801. 
 151. Id. at 762. 
 152. Id. at 763-64. 
 153. Id. at 764 (footnote omitted). 
 154. Id.
2010]                     POWERFUL PARTICULARS 577 
toxin defenses is uncertain and “varies to some degree”155 She has a 
different object in mind. As in Watson and Hospers, an important 
current in Falk’s discussion involves imagining and articulating 
particularistic causal explanations of bad acts. To this end, she lays 
out in moderate detail several reasons why childhood exposure to 
violence might lead to violent acts as an adult: it can cause serious 
mental illness, depression, and anxiety; it can cause emotional and 
cognitive impairment; it can lead to “alterations of personality . . . 
and . . . ideological interpretations of the world that provide a 
framework” through which the actor interprets his circumstances; it 
models and teaches violent behavior; it catalyzes frustration; and it 
inculcates pathways from frustration to violence.156 In sketching this 
array of causal mechanisms, she hopes to “transcend generalized 
theories”157 of social influence, to describe “sophisticated causal 
explanations”158 of the sort that can “provide more . . .  specific 
articulations of the impact of discrete social toxins on . . .  
criminality.”159 In short, she strives to carve a passage from passive, 
airy abstractions like “a hard childhood causes crime” to an engaged, 
particularistic vision of why this might be so.    
 The value of this project lies less in the accuracy of its various 
claims than in what it shows us about how particularistic 
explanations of wrongdoing influence our moral intuitions. As 
Watson and Hospers did, Falk puts us in touch with the concerns and 
attitudes that drive the originationist intuition. As they did, Falk 
shows how the causes of present wrongful acts might be traced back 
to the wrongdoer’s childhood. As they did, she highlights for us the 
ways in which present offenders were once vulnerable and malleable 
themselves, encouraging us to see wrongdoers as victims—exposed to 
brutality against their will, damaged psychologically and 
developmentally, and transformed into something they would not 
otherwise have been. As in Watson and Hospers, this fuels feelings of 
sympathy, empathy, and compassion toward such wrongdoers. In the 
same vein, Falk’s catalog of toxic social phenomena puts us in 
position to imagine how, without those perverting forces, a 
wrongdoer might have turned out “normal” and familiar, like “us.” 
This, in turn, makes us more likely to identify with the wrongdoer, to 
stand in his shoes, to scrutinize social blaming practices with the 
critical eye of the blamed. Now we are more likely to worry about the 
fairness of blaming offenders for acts traceable back to the adults 
                                                                                                                                       
 155. Id. at 781. Falk suggests that the social science evidence regarding exposure to 
“real-life violence” is the strongest. Id.
156. Id. at 763. 
 157. Id. at 736. 
 158. Id. at 806. 
 159. Id. at 736. 
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who abused them when they were children.160 Now we are more likely 
to worry that plucking the wrongful actor out of this teeming web of 
causes is essentially arbitrary—why focus on him, when his act is so 
much the product of everything else? Now we are reminded of the 
central role that luck plays here, given how little control children 
have over their exposure to social toxins, and wonder if it is fair to 
blame violent actors when the cycle of violence is such a lottery. 
Thus, imagining the causes of wrongdoing particularistically, we can 
explore determinism in a new and deeper way than we had before. 
And as we do so, we discover aspects of caused wrongdoing that 
amplify the originationist intuition, putting new pressure on our 
initial inclination to blame the wrongdoer.   
 Falk’s analysis, then, taps the same power source that Watson 
and Hospers tap. She uses social science evidence to pull us into a 
particularistic imagining of caused wrongful conduct. Full of 
engrossing detail, her account engages us in a way abstractions 
cannot. In so doing, it amplifies our originationist intuitions about 
responsibility, and thus shows how incompatibilists can recapture 
the power of the particular.  
(c)   Stories from Situationist Psychology 
 In recent years, responsibility theorists have also returned to 
individual psychology—not the Freudian sort that Hospers embraced, 
but several strands of contemporary empirical psychology, including 
social cognition, cognitive psychology, and situationist psychology. 
These lines of research have proven to be rich new sources for 
particularistic causal explanations of wrongful acts.   
 Consider, for example, how philosopher John Doris uses the body 
of research sometimes described as situationist psychology.161 As 
Doris explains, situationist psychology encompasses a diverse array 
of experiments that, taken together, show that contingent and 
prosaic situational variables influence human conduct to a far 
greater extent than we generally realize162: “seemingly insubstantial 
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situational factors have substantial effects on what people do.”163 He 
grounds his discussion in an extended series of concrete examples 
drawn from the situationist literature: 
? Finding an abandoned dime in a payphone makes us more likely 
to lend a stranger a helping hand: “[i]f greedy Jeff finds the dime, 
he’ll likely help, and if compassionate Nina doesn’t, she very 
likely won’t.”164
? The smell of coffee makes us more likely to help a person in need: 
“subjects near a fragrant bakery or coffee shop [are] more likely 
to change a dollar bill when asked than those near a neutral-
smelling dry goods store.”165
? The sound of a lawnmower suppresses our helping behavior: one 
study “found passersby markedly less likely to help someone 
retrieve dropped books if a lawnmower was running loudly 
nearby.”166
? Placed in groups of two or three, we are less likely to help 
imperiled strangers than if we were alone: “[s]eventy percent of 
bystanders offered help when they waited alone, compared with 
7 percent in the company of an unresponsive confederate.”167
? Placed in groups of two or three, we are less likely to respond to 
apparent emergencies than if we were alone. Sitting in a waiting 
room filling with smoke, 75 percent of solitary subjects “reported 
the smoke to experimenters within four minutes . . .  [but] [i]n a 
trial with three naive [sic] subjects per group, in only 38 percent 
of groups did someone report the smoke . . . .”168
? Told they are late for a meeting, seminary students hurry past 
(or step directly over) prostrate, moaning men on the sidewalk, 
though most would have helped had they been told they were 
                                                                                                                                       
ical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003); see also
Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges to Legal Theory and 
Practice, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1081 (2003).   
 Some psychologists reject situationism. For one example, see John Sabini, Michael 
Siepmann & Julia Stein, The Really Fundamental Attribution Error in Social Psychological 
Research, 12 PSYCH. INQUIRY 1 (2001) (arguing that seminal situationist studies can be 
reinterpreted to fit the traditional dispositionist model, positing that dispositional tenden-
cy to avoid embarrassment or save face explains seminal studies better than situationism). 
 163. DORIS, supra note 8, at 28. 
 164. Id. at 30 (citing A. M. Isen & P. F. Levin, Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Coo-
kies and Kindness, 21 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 387-88 (1972)).  
 165. Id. at 31 (citing R. A. Baron, The Sweet Smell of . . . Helping: Effects of Pleasant 
Ambient Fragrance on Prosocial Behavior in Shopping Malls, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 498, 500-01 (1997)).  
 166. Id. at 181 n. 8 (citing K. E. Mathews & L. K. Cannon, Environmental Noise Levels 
as a Determinant of Helping Behavior, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 571, 574-75 
[1975]). 
 167. Id. at 32-33 (citing B. Latané & J. Rodin, A Lady in Distress: Inhibiting Effects of 
Friends and Strangers on Bystander Intervention, 5 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
189, 197 (1969)). 
 168. Id. at 32 (citing BIBB LATANÉ & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER:
WHY DOESN’T HE HELP? (1970)). 
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early: “[t]he thought of being a few minutes late was enough to 
make subjects not notice or disregard a person’s suffering.”169
? A calmly stated order from a laboratory researcher can induce 
most of us to inflict what we believe to be torturous and even 
fatal shocks on a stranger: in Stanley Milgram’s famous 
experiment, “the majority of subjects were willing to torture 
another individual to what seemed the door of death without any 
more direct pressure than the polite insistence of the 
experimenter.”170
? Given the role of “prison guard” in a mock prison, measurably 
“normal” subjects quickly take to abusing and torturing peers 
given “prisoner” roles: in Philip Zimbardo’s notorious experiment, 
placement in the mock prison resulted in “a precipitous descent 
into barbarism.”171
As Doris explains, situationist psychology takes these findings (and 
numerous others) to converge upon the central point that seemingly 
inconsequential situational variations have a dramatic impact on 
what we do, one that can swamp the influence of our own character 
traits and dispositions.172 That is, more than we realize, we do what 
we do because we are steered toward doing so by subtle phenomena 
in our situations rather than because we are “the kinds of people” 
who do those things.   
 For Doris, this poses new challenges for conventional accounts of 
responsibility.173 As he is careful to explain, however, the challenges 
do not lie in situationism’s generic implications of determinism174:
“The worry, let me emphasize . . .  is not simply that situationism 
tells a causal story about the origins of behavior” or that 
“psychological states are caused.”175 Rather, the problem lies in what 
situationism tells us about “how they are caused.”176 In particular, 
Doris takes situationist research to raise the possibility that 
“situational factors are pervasively implicated in substantial 
cognitive and motivational failures,”177 such that “exculpating 
                                                                                                                                       
 169. Id. at 34 (citing John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A 
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impairments in the powers of reflective self-control” may be “more 
the rule than the exception.”178 In many of the experiments described 
above, for example, subjects did the “wrong” thing—shocked another 
human being, abused a mock “inmate”—while struggling with the 
feeling that they should not do it.179 Perhaps this suggests that people 
do not generally have the powers of self-control necessary for 
responsibility.180 And in many of these experiments, the subject’s 
capacity for “instrumental” and moral reasoning seems to have been 
impaired due to situational influences.181 Perhaps this suggests that 
we do not have the “normative competence”182 necessary for 
responsibility as often as we assume.183 The primary focus of Doris’s 
discussion, then, is on the ways in which situationist findings seem to 
suggest we lack certain features arguably essential to morally 
responsible agents.    
 Along the way, however, Doris’s discussion also suggests a second 
layer of problems for responsibility. Working through his survey of 
situationist findings, following him as he imaginatively explores 
“how” our conduct is caused, we find that Doris’s discussion has the 
power to activate the same originationist intuitions that Watson, 
Hospers, and Falk184 tap into. Like them, Doris describes 
mechanisms driving human acts in close and colorful detail, 
cataloging several discrete and peculiar situational phenomena that 
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chology, supra note 8.  
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tug human actors into one sort of action or another. Not surprisingly, 
his vividly detailed discussion stirs up many of the concerns and 
attitudes associated with the originationist intuition. Seeing the 
bizarre way abandoned dimes, coffee aromas, and mock prisons move 
us exacerbates the worry that there is something misguided and 
unfair about funneling our reactions to bad acts at the actor alone—
should we not direct our reactions to the puppet masters, not the 
puppet? Seeing how contingent and arbitrary the influential 
variables are, we are confronted again with the problems of moral 
luck: if the reason you help a stranger in need but I do not is that you 
are in the presence of fragrant coffee while I am in the presence of a 
noisy lawn mower, the differences in our conduct do not seem to say 
much about the differences between us. Resenting one of us but not 
the other seems to make a lottery of the moral sentiments.  
 The vivid detail in these stories also invites us to identify with the 
unwittingly channeled actors in these stories. It is easy to summon 
Baron’s coffee fragrance to mind, to put ourselves in the shoes of his 
subject as she strolls the mall, and to imagine how her mood changes 
as the aroma engulfs her. The meticulous description of Milgram’s 
shock experiment transports us back to Milgram’s lab, where we too 
are perplexed by the strange machinery around us, shaken by the 
unexpected instructions we are given, and disoriented by the 
authoritarian researcher’s polite implacability. Inevitably, we find 
ourselves standing in the shoes of the subjects, feeling the invisible 
puppet strings of the situation, and understanding we would likely 
have reacted the same way. Now we experience “being caused” in a 
more imaginative and more personal way, from the inside out. Now 
we engage determinism more deeply. Now the originationist intuition 
that the responsible agent should not be moved in these puppet-like 
ways gains force.   
 Thus, the same dynamics are in play here that were in play in 
Watson, Hospers, and Falk. Doris’s survey of situationism summons 
the same concerns and attitudes. It evokes the originationist 
intuition in the same way and thus puts pressure on the 
compatibilist move and responsibility attribution in the same way.   
 To be fair, Doris himself ultimately contends that responsibility 
can survive the challenge from situationist psychology. In reaching 
this conclusion, however, Doris overlooks a hidden feature of his own 
presentation. Early on, he excuses himself from the debate about 
whether determinism itself threatens responsibility, in part (it 
appears) because he does not think situationist psychology has much 
to say about whether determinism is true. In so doing, however, he 
conflates the question of whether situationism proves determinism 
with the question of whether situationism changes our intuitions 
about the significance of determinism for responsibility. In fact, while 
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it is true that situationist psychology adds little to the debate about 
whether determinism is true, that does not mean that situationist 
psychology is irrelevant to the debate about responsibility for 
determined acts. On the contrary, as I have suggested, situationist 
psychology has much to offer in that latter debate. It encourages and 
enables us to engage in a kind of reflective process that is otherwise 
very difficult—one in which we imaginatively flesh out what it would 
mean to be a determined actor, stand in the shoes of the determined 
actor, and scrutinize responsibility for determined acts from the 
determined person’s perspective. Doris appreciates that concrete 
details influence moral intuitions—he is convinced “that thinking 
productively about ethics requires thinking realistically about 
humanity . . . [and that] . . . facts about human psychology should . . .  
constrain ethical reflection”185—but he overlooks some of the ways 
this plays out with situationism, determinism, and responsibility.      
 Doris’s analysis, then, taps the same power source that Watson, 
Hospers, and Falk did. His survey of situationist psychology pulls us 
into a particularistic imagining of determined conduct. Full of 
startling detail, his account engages us in a way abstractions cannot. 
In so doing, it amplifies our originationist intuitions about 
responsibility and thus our doubts about the compatibilist move and 
about attributing responsibility in a determined universe. 
(d)   The Common Dynamic: Using Behavioral Science Stories to 
Narrow the Particularism Gap 
 These three examples each reflect a phenomenon that can be seen 
throughout the behavioral science challenge to responsibility: the 
behavioral sciences threaten responsibility, in part, by narrowing the 
particularism gap between compatibilism and incompatibilism. 
 As we have seen, particulars have a powerful influence on the 
process of moral reflection. And, as we have seen, compatibilists have 
traditionally been better positioned to capitalize on the power of the 
particular than incompatibilists—not because compatibilism is 
somehow inherently “more particularistic” than incompatibilism, but 
because, given the state of human knowledge and the limits on 
human imagination, it has always been easier to give a 
particularistic description of a single wrongful act itself than of the 
causal processes resulting in that act. As a result, when theorists 
consider whether determinism poses a threat to responsibility, the 
determinism element of this question has often been presented at a 
very high level of abstraction. We are asked to imagine that 
everything is determined, or that “bad background” or “family abuse” 
is involved. Our predictably pallid reactions to such abstractions are 
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then juxtaposed against our much more personal and potent 
reactions to vivid descriptions of particular wrongful acts. The 
resultant particularism gap tilts the balance toward attributions of 
responsibility. Deeply engaged with the wrongful act, unable to 
connect with the story of its causes, we are drawn powerfully  
to blame.   
 But, as the examples above suggest, findings in behavioral science 
research can push us to revisit the determinism prong of the 
question. As each example illustrates, the behavioral sciences provide 
the material to flesh out and imaginatively reconstruct concrete, 
detailed, and reasonably realistic causal accounts of wrongful acts. It 
is not that they provide comprehensive and uncontroversially 
accurate causal accounts–no one would say that Hospers’ 
Freudianism, Falk’s sociology, or Doris’s situationist psychology offer 
complete explanations for wrongful acts, or that they are obviously 
“right”—but their power does not depend on these things. Rather, the 
power of these behavioral science stories lies in the way they role 
model and invite serious efforts to imagine what it means to be a 
determined actor. They articulate plausible links between some of 
the most influential forces in human life (family, social conditions, 
situational influences) and human wrongdoing, treating those links 
as accessible and envisionable rather than unimaginable. And they 
flesh out those links in vivid detail, giving them the kind of texture 
and substance that catalyzes imaginative reflection. Thus, whether 
or not the particular claims the behavioral scientists make are 
always convincing, their stories whet our imaginative appetites. 
Having tasted particularistic determinism, we are more likely to 
keep thinking about determinism in particularistic ways. In this 
sense, behavioral science stories like the ones Hospers, Falk, and 
Doris tell invite us to change our moral perspective, to come down 
from the airy clouds where determinism is assumed arguendo and 
grapple with the nitty-gritty nuts and bolts of life in a determined 
universe. In this sense, these descriptions really do bring 
determinism “to life.” 
 And, as we have seen, this shift to a more life-like conception of 
determined wrongdoing tends to evoke much more potent 
incompatibilist reactions than the traditional highly abstract version 
does. The life-like conception induces us to engage the causes of 
wrongdoing emotionally and intellectually, to hold them in our 
imaginations, and to reflect upon them in ways that allow them to 
make associative connections with our feelings, values, and lives. It 
speaks to our moral intuitions in ways that abstractions cannot, 
affecting them in powerful and important ways. We identify, 
empathize, and feel compassion. Standing in new shoes, we worry in 
new ways about moral luck, moral tunnel vision, and fairness. All the 
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various tributaries that feed into the originationist intuition are 
opened up, and the intuition comes flooding back into our moral 
reflections. This is the secret heart of a phenomenon that 
compatibilist legal scholars so often concede—the more we explain a 
person’s act the more we are inclined to excuse it.  
 This, then, is where the real power of the behavioral science 
challenge to responsibility lies. The behavioral sciences provide a 
slowly growing tool kit for construction of credible particularistic 
descriptions of the causal machinery behind wrongdoings. The result 
is that we are slowly acquiring the resources to create credible 
particularistic causal explanations of human acts; and engaging 
these particularistic explanations, it turns out, revitalizes the 
originationist intuition. In this way, the behavioral sciences give 
incompatibilists the material they need to construct descriptions of 
the causes of wrongdoing that will engage us and our moral 
intuitions as deeply as the crime stories compatibilists have always 
found so easy to tell. 
 Of course, it is likely that many readers, having read through the 
samples above, remain inclined to compatibilism rather than 
originationism. But the claim here is not that a handful of behavioral 
science descriptions of the causes of human acts will instantly 
transform a compatibilist into an originationist. Rather, the 
argument is that the behavioral sciences pose a threat to 
compatibilism not just for the somewhat pallid reason that they 
suggest determinism, but for the much more potent reason that they 
generate a steadily growing accumulation of particularistic accounts 
of the causes of human acts, and such accounts have significantly 
more power to bring originationist intuitions to life than abstract 
portrayals of determinism do. Given our intuitions about free will 
and responsibility, it is never easy to be a compatibilist; but it is 
easier to be a compatibilist when determinism is imagined as a pure 
abstraction than it is when we look directly at the causal machinery 
implicated in particular human acts, as the behavioral sciences push 
us to do.  
IV.   CONCLUSION
 The struggle to understand responsibility and its preconditions is 
an ancient one and will surely persist far into the future. But the 
struggle has never been and should not be conceived as a static one. 
On the contrary, the struggle has been and should continue to be 
informed by developments in other areas of human inquiry. Once, for 
example, theological concerns played a central role in the debates 
about free will and responsibility; but as theology, physical science, 
and moral theory diverged, theological considerations moved from 
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the center of the debate to the margins. At the same time, advances 
in the physical sciences over the last two centuries have pushed 
concerns about physical determinism to the forefront of theorizing 
about responsibility such that most academic philosophers now 
consider physical determinism (or some equivalent) a foregone 
conclusion—a view that might have shocked (some) responsibility 
theorists from earlier ages. The ancient debate about freewill and 
responsibility, then, is perpetually renewed by changes and advances 
in our understanding of other areas of human inquiry.  
 In this Article, I have suggested that advances in the behavioral 
sciences may have significant ramifications for responsibility 
attribution. This may seem, at first glance, an obvious proposition. 
After all, our theories of responsibility attribution obviously must be 
grounded in explicit and implicit moral psychologies. In order to 
attribute responsibility to a person, we must have some idea of how 
that person works and acts, some working moral psychology that 
explains how a person’s act can merit a moral response like praise or 
blame. If so, new discoveries regarding the machinery of human 
perception, cognition, desire, choice, and conduct may have 
significant implications for responsibility attribution. If our empirical 
discoveries are inconsistent with the posited moral psychology on 
which we ground responsibility attribution, this naturally raises 
urgent questions about the propriety of responsibility attribution 
going forward. At the very least, we must determine whether the 
discovered psychology is as supportive of responsibility attribution as 
the previously posited one. 
 Though this proposition may seem obvious, criminal theory does 
not always embrace it. As Part II recounted, criminal theorists 
sometimes fend off suggestions that the behavioral sciences might 
threaten responsibility by fiat, bluntly declaring that the criminal 
law cannot or should not accommodate behavioral science evidence 
that human behavior is caused or determined. A more engaged 
response takes up arguments from the compatibilist tradition. This is 
an influential and sophisticated philosophical position, and criminal 
theorists have generally been satisfied that compatibilism is 
sufficient to defeat whatever threat the behavioral sciences pose to 
responsibility attribution. 
 As I have argued in this Article, however, it is far from clear that 
compatibilism is an adequate defense against the challenge from the 
behavioral sciences. Indeed, I have suggested, compatibilism does not 
speak to the main thrust of that challenge at all. In philosophy, 
compatibilism has been developed to show that responsibility is 
viable in a determined universe, and many theorists believe that it is 
successful in doing so. But, as I have argued, the behavioral sciences 
threaten responsibility not so much because they suggest 
2010]                     POWERFUL PARTICULARS 587 
determinism is true, but because they describe determinism in a 
particular way, a way that brings determinism to life. Providing us 
with a steady supply of particularized accounts of caused human 
conduct, the behavioral sciences induce us to shift from an abstract 
conception of determinism to a particularistic conception of caused 
human action. This particularistic conception engages our emotions 
in a much deeper way than its abstract counterpart. It invites us  
to experience and think about determinism in a much more personal 
way and to connect determinism with potent and morally significant 
feelings about ourselves, about others, and about our culture and 
society. At the same time, it induces us to reflect on the role of 
determinism in human acts in a more careful, concrete, and  
textured way.   
 This, I have argued, significantly shifts our moral intuitions about 
the significance of causation for moral responsibility. It dramatically 
amplifies the already potent originationist intuition that is strongly 
at odds with compatibilism. It highlights, especially, the problems of 
moral luck and fairness that compatibilism generates. And it brings 
out attitudes—like identification, empathy, and compassion—that 
call compatibilism into question. In these ways, we see that “live” 
determinism strikes us more deeply than theoretical determinism, 
and that contemplating live determinism makes us far more likely to 
see the behavioral science threat to responsibility as a real and 
potent one. 
 This is not to say, of course, that the behavioral sciences make 
compatibilism impossible or that responsibility attribution cannot 
survive progress in the behavioral sciences. Rather, it is meant to 
show that the traditional tactics for refuting the behavioral science 
challenge to criminal responsibility have failed to engage the most 
potent features of that challenge. Calibrated to defuse anxieties 
about determinism understood in the abstract, they do not speak to 
the kind of determinism the behavioral sciences offer us—one set out 
in particularistic detail. If criminal theory is to fend off the challenge 
from the behavioral sciences, then, it must turn its attention to the 
real challenge from the behavioral sciences. It cannot rest on 
compatibilism alone; it must also show how compatibilism can 
survive the strange and vital story told by the behavioral sciences. 
This is a project criminal theorists have not yet fully taken up.  
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